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INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines the legal and ethical validity of nonrefundable retainers, 1 which are being used increasingly by lawyers. 2 Judicial 
consideration of nonrefundable retainers has been scant, 3 case analysis 
has been superficial and outcomes inconclusive.4 Bar associations have 
opined both favorably5 and unfavorably. 6 Where nonrefundable retain-
1. A nonrefundable retainer is an agreement between lawyer and client providing for 
the payment of part or all of the fee in advance of the lawyer's performance. The pay-
ment is designated in the retainer agreement as nonrefundable. The dispute regarding the 
validity of these agreements usually arises when the client terminates the lawyer's em-
ployment without just cause before completion of the task and demands return of the 
unearned part of the advance fee. 
2. Nonrefundable retainer agreements are reproduced in lawyers' handbooks and 
study aids. See, e.g., R. Felder, Lawyers Practical Handbook to the New Divorce Law 
27-29 (1980); J. McRae, Legal Fees and Representation Agreements 88 (1983) (Mono-
graph Series, ABA Section of Economics of Law Practice); New York Matrimonial Prac-
tice 197-98 (PLI 1979); L'Estrange & Tucker, Fee Agreements, 27 Prac. Law. 11 , 23-25 
(April 1981). They are commonly used throughout the New York metropolitan area. 
See Jacobson v. Sassower, 113 Misc. 2d 279,284,452 N.Y.S.2d 981,985 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 
1982), aff'd per curiam, 122 Misc. 2d 863, 474 N.Y.S.2d 167 (App. Term. 1983), aff'd 
mem., 107 A.D.2d 603, 483 N.Y.S.2d 711 , aff'd mem. , 66 N.Y.2d 991,489 N.E.2d 1283, 
499 N.Y.S.2d 381 (1985). The authors have been informed by lawyers in other major 
metropolitan areas that nonrefundable retainer agreements are in common use in domes-
tic relations and criminal law practices and are also in use in corporate practices. The 
existence of bar association opinions and judicial determinations of their validity also 
indicates their widespread use. See infra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. 
3. This is probably explained by the economics of litigation. The authors have been 
informed by practicing attorneys that nonrefundable retainers in the amount of $1000 to 
$3000 are most common. Since the attorney has usually performed some services before 
being discharged by the client, the amount being sought by the client will be less than the 
amount of the advance fee payment. Litigation costs to recover these sums often equal or 
exceed the amount in contention. Demands for return of advance nonrefundable fee pay-
ments most often are referred to arbitration which yields no paper record that can be 
examined. See generally Millikan, Arbitration of Attorney-Client Disputes, 53 L.A.B.J. 
270 (1977) (Los Angeles County Bar Association active in arbitration of fee disputes); 
The Resolution of Fee Disputes: A Report and Model Bylaws, Special Comm. on Reso-
lution of Fee Disputes of the A.B.A. Sec. of Bar Activities 4 ( 1974) (recommending that 
arbitration committee hear client's fee grievance for merit even when lawyer refuses bind-
ing arbitration); Comment, Arbitration of Attorney Fee Disputes: New Direction for Pro-
f essional Responsibility, 5 UCLA-Alaska L. Rev. 309 (1976) (arbitration most effective 
and efficient method for settling attorney fee disputes). 
4. See, e.g., Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Angell, Holmes & Lea, 838 F.2d 395 
(9th Cir. 1988) (invalid); Jersey Land & Dev. Corp. v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 48 
(D.N.J . 1972) (ambiguous); Baranowski v. State Bar, 24 Cal. 3d 153, 593 P.2d 613, 154 
Cal. Rptr. 752 (1979) (en bane) (ambiguous); Smith v. Binder, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 21,477 
N.E.2d 606 (1985) (ambiguous); Jacobson v. Sassower, I 13 Misc. 2d 279, 452 N.Y.S.2d 
981 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1982) (invalid), aff 'd per curiam , 122 Misc. 2d 863, 474 N.Y.S.2d 
167 (App. Term. 1983), aff'd mem., 107 A.D.2d 603, 483 N.Y.S.2d 711 , aff'd mem., 66 
N.Y.2d 991,489 N.E.2d 1283, 499 N.Y.S.2d 381 (1985); Jacobs v. Holston, 70 Ohio App. 
2d 55, 434 N.E.2d 738 (1980) (ambiguous). 
5. See Disciplinary Board of the Hawaii Supreme Court, Formal Op. 29 (1985); 
Illinois State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 722 (1981), digested in Law. 
Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 801 :3007; Maryland State Bar Ass'n Comm. on 
Ethics, Op. 80-21 (n .d.), digested in Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 801:4301; 
Oregon Bar Op. 509 (1986), digested in Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 
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ers have been upheld, it has been without consideration of contract or 
fiduciary law principles. 7 As a result, nonrefundable retainers have been 
categorized as sui generis and validated by judicial fiat, thereby escaping 
scrutiny and definition. 
This Article argues that nonrefundable retainers ought not to remain 
undefined. Rather, they are contractual forfeiture provisions whose ethi-
cal and legal validity must be gauged according to well-established legal, 
fiduciary, and ethical concepts and doctrines. 8 From these perspectives, 
most nonrefundable retainers are unethical and illegal. Courts and bar 
association ethics committees, however, refuse to apply these doctrines to 
nonrefundable retainers and treat attorney-client employment contracts 
differently from all other contracts of employment. Consequently, the 
position of lawyers has been aggrandized in relation to clients. 9 
901:7102; South Carolina Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 81-15 (1982), digested in 
Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 801:7903; Texas Bar Op. 391 (1978), digested 
in 0. Maro, 1980 Supplement to the Digest of Bar Ass'n Ethics Opinions 12,749 (1982). 
6. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 998 (1967), reprinted in II 
ABA Informal Ethics Opinions 161, 165 (1975); Cleveland Bar Ass'n Op. 84-1 (1984), 
digested in Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 801 :6952; Kansas Bar Ass'n Prof. 
Ethics Comm. Op. 84-12 (1984); Michigan Bar Op. CI-962 (1983), digested in Law. Man. 
on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 801:4873; Nassau County Bar Op. 85-5 (1985), digested 
in Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 801:6208. 
1. See sources cited supra note 5. 
8. These concepts and doctrines include general and special retainers, the right of a 
client to terminate a retainer agreement without penalty, the excessiveness or reasonable-
ness of a lawyer's fee, judicial forfeiture clauses, liquidated damages and penalties, and 
mitigation of damages. 
9. This is not the only example of lawyers creating special rules to govern their own 
conduct different from those they have developed to regulate the conduct of others. Con-
sider the rules promulgated by lawyers for the medical and legal system. The malpractice 
doctrine rule for doctors evaluates conduct in light of the customary practice of physi-
cians in good standing and requires that "there must be a want of ordinary and reason-
able care, leading to a bad result." Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 210, 49 N.E. 760, 
762 (1898); see Mack v. Lydia E. Hall Hosp., 121 A.D.2d 431, 503 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1986); 
P. Danzon, Medical Malpractice 139-40 (1985). Conversely, under the malpractice rule 
for lawyers the client must show that "but for" the lawyer's negligence, the client would 
have won. See, e.g., Sage v. Glaze, No. 60,074 (Kan. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 1988) (LEXIS, 
States library, Kan file); Basic Food Indus. v. Grant, 107 Mich. App. 685,310 N.W.2d 26 
(1981); Pool v. Burlison, 736 S.W.2d 485 (Mo. App. 1987); Katsaris v. Scelsi, 115 Misc. 
2d 115, 453 N.Y.S.2d 994 (Sup. Ct. 1982); Rorrer v. Cooke, 69 N.C. App. 305, 317 
S.E.2d 34 (1984), rev'd, 313 N.C. 338, 329 S.E.2d 355 (1985); Chocktoot v. Smith, 280 
Ore. 567, 571 P.2d 1255 (1977) (en bane); R. Mallen & V. Levit, Legal Malpractice 
§ 583, at 738 (2d ed. 1981 & Supp. 1985). This rule frequently insulates lawyers from 
liability by placing a formidable, almost unsustainable burden on the client. 
Consider the lawyer who fails to file a notice of appeal within the allotted time and 
whose client is thereby deprived of his right to appeal. The client must show that had the 
notice been timely filed, he would have won on appeal. Unless the client can show that 
the court below made a clear and demonstrable error of law that itself led to the client's 
loss, he has not sustained the burden. See Hyduke v. Grant, 351 N.W.2d 675,678 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1984); see also Nelson v. Appalachian Ins. Co. of Providence, 399 So. 2d 711, 
712 (La. Ct. App. 1981). The comparable case on the medical side is quite different. For 
instance, if a doctor's inaccurate diagnosis leads to the omission of a specific medical 
protocol that would have contributed to a 60 percent likelihood of the patient's survival, 
and the patient dies, the doctor is guilty of malpractice. The patient is compensated for 
152 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57 
Part I of this Article examines the fiduciary law principle that gives a 
client the unfettered right to discharge his attorney without cause and 
without penalty. 10 The analysis develops a trust-based theory of the at-
torney-client relationship that leads inexorably to the conclusion that 
nonrefundable retainers, in most instances, are incompatible with client 
discharge rights because nonrefundable retainers impose discharge costs 
the "loss of chance"-the chance of avoiding some adverse result or achieving some 
favorable result. Compare Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626, 632 (4th Cir. 1966) 
(doctor is answerable for destroying any chance of survival) and Jeanes v. Milner, 428 
F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1970) (adopting reasoning in Hicks) and Servidone Constr. Corp. v. 
Security Ins. Co., 64 N.Y.2d 419, 425, 477 N.E.2d 441, 445, 488 N.Y.S.2d 139, 143 
(1985) (insurance company that failed to defend insurer bears burden of proving probable 
outcome of lawsuit had insured not settled) and Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 99 
Wash. 2d 609,614,664 P.2d 474, 476-77 (1973) (evidence ofloss of chance to survive due 
to failure to diagnose sufficient for jury to determine proximate cause) with Phillips v. 
Clancy, 152 Ariz. 415, 418, 733 P.2d 300, 303 (Ct. App. 1986) (objective standard) and 
Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp., 45 A.D.2d 177, 179-80, 357 N.Y.S. 2d 508, 510-11 
(1974) (in medical malpractice action, jury may rely on expert's estimation of chance of 
survival with proper administration of medication), aff'd mem., 37 N.Y.2d 719, 337 
N.E.2d 128, 374 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1975) and Daugert v. Pappas, 104 Wash. 2d 254, 256, 
263, 704 P.2d 600, 605, 606 (1985) (holding Herskovits loss of chance analysis inapplica-
ble to legal malpractice case). But a lawyer in the same circumstances would be exoner-
ated because the client could not show that, had the protocol been applied, the client 
would have won. 
The "but for" standard is so contrary to the usual operating technique of the lawyer 
that its use in the legal malpractice standard seems disingenuous. Consider the typical 
case of the client who comes to the lawyer seeking redress for injury to his person or 
rights. Given the vagaries of courts and juries, the lawyer generally speaks in terms of 
likelihood, such as, "We have a good chance," never stating, "We will win the case." See 
generally D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1983) (discussing uncertainty 
of legal system). But that is exactly what the client must prove to sustain a malpractice 
claim against a lawyer. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Price, 231 F. 397, 403 (4th Cir. 
1916); Note, The Standard of Proof of Causation in Legal Malpractice Cases, 63 Cornell 
L. Rev. 666 (1978); cf. Note, Medical Malpractice Damage Caps: Navigating the Safe 
Harbors, 65 Wash. U.L.Q. 565 (1987) (analyzing legislative responses to increasing medi-
cal malpractice litigation and inconsistent judicial results). 
Another example of lawyers creating a special rule for themselves is the rule that ex-
empts lawyers from liability to third parties not in privity for negligent misrepresentation, 
while extending such liability to other professionals such as accountants and doctors. 
Compare Kirsch v. Duryea, 21 Cal. 3d 303, 309, 578 P.2d 935, 939, 146 Cal. Rptr. 218, 
222 (1978) (unfair to make attorney pay damages for mere "mistake in choice") and 
Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1, 16, 312 N.W.2d 585, 592 (1981) (attorney owes no 
duty of care to adverse party in litigation) and Berry v. Dodson, Nunley & Taylor, P.C., 
717 S.W.2d 716,718 (Tex. Civ. App-San Antonio 1986) (attorney owes no duty of care 
to those outside attorney-client privilege), writ granted, 729 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1987) and 
Bell v. Manning, 613 S.W.2d 335, 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) 
(same) and Hawkins v. King County, 24 Wash. App. 338, 344, 602 P.2d 361 , 365 (1979) 
(lawyer generally owes no duty to disclose client information unless aware of client's 
intent to harm unknowing victim) with H . Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N .J. 324, 352, 
461 A.2d 138, 153 (1983) (auditor owes duty to all foreseeable recipients of financial 
statements) and Armstrong v. Morgan, 545 S.W.3d 45, 47 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 
1976) (physician owes duty of care not to injure patient during physical examination and 
to give accurate report) and Petersen v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 428, 671 P.2d 230, 237 
(1983) (physician owes duty of care to anyone foreseeably injured by patient with drug-
related mental problem). 
10. See infra Part I A-B. 
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on clients. In addition, the distinction between general and special re-
tainer agreements-which has been seized upon to subject general re-
tainer fees to contract rather than fiduciary law and thereby to legitimate 
a form of nonrefundable retainers11-is examined and criticized on the 
ground that both general and special retainers obstruct client freedom to 
discharge lawyers. 12 
Part II addresses a potentially significant statutory argument against 
the trust-based theory of the attorney-client relationship. 13 This argu-
ment, founded on a New York statute ("section 474")14 that has been 
adopted by many other states, purports to mandate that attorney-client 
agreements shall be "unrestrained by law." 15 This Article challenges 
that argument by offering a more historically accurate analysis of the 
statute's language than the literal, yet erroneous, interpretations that 
have been rendered. The discussion concludes that section 474's ostensi-
ble proscription of regulation of attorney compensation agreements re-
peals previous legislative ordinations of attorney-client fee agreements, 
but does not limit judicial superintendence of the retainer agreement. 
Part III proceeds on the basis that the analyses of fiduciary, case, trust 
and statutory law fall short of invalidating nonrefundable retainers; it 
therefore examines the validity of nonrefundable retainers from a tradi-
tional contract law perspective; specifically, whether they are legitimate 
liquidated damages clauses or function as unenforceable penalties. 16 The 
analysis concludes that most nonrefundable retainers function as penal-
ties because the forfeited sum is rarely a reasonable, good faith estimate 
of damages. Next, the possibility of legitimating the nonrefundable re-
tainer under principles of judicial forfeiture is explored but rejected. 17 
Finally, the contract analysis considers the effect on valid nonrefundable 
retainers of the doctrine of avoidable consequences. 18 The Article con-
cludes that most nonrefundable retainers are legally and ethically 
impermissible. 
I. THE LAWYER AS FIDUCIARY 
A lawyer is a fiduciary for his client. 19 While it is commonly said that 
11. See Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170, 176, 114 N.E. 46, 48 (1916). 
12. See infra notes 44-58 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra Part II. 
14. N.Y. Jud. Law§ 474 (McKinney 1983) ("section 474"). Although this Article is 
based chiefly on New York law, its significance is national in scope because the principal 
New York case, Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170, 114 N.E. 46 (1916) and the apparently 
conflicting statute, section 474, have been followed or adopted by many other states. See 
infra note 137 and accompanying text. 
15. N .Y. Jud. Law § 474 (McKinney 1983). 
16. See infra notes 174-201 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra notes 203-45 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra notes 249-54 and accompanying text. 
19. See Gaffney v. Harmon, 405 Ill. 273, 277, 90 N.E.2d 785, 788 (1950) ("A fiduci-
ary relationship exists as a matter of law between attorney and client"); C. Wolfram, 
Modern Legal Ethics § 4.1, at 146 ( 1986) ("the designation of 'fiduciary,' . . . surely 
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fiduciary duties arise when a relationship requires one person to act pri-
marily for another's benefit, 20 such a rationale is unacceptably overinclu-
sive. A better view is that lawyers are fiduciaries because the client's 
retention of an attorney to exercise "professional judgment" on his be-
half21 necessarily requires the client to repose trust and confidence in the 
attorney. 22 When he exercises that professional judgment, the lawyer 
attaches to the [lawyer-client] relationship"). See also H. Drinker, Legal Ethics 89-96 
(1953) (citing basic fiduciary responsibilities owed by attorney to client such as the ban on 
commingling of funds, deliberate deception and unnecessary delay); E. Wood, Fee Con-
tracts of Lawyers 152 (1936) ("the construction of fee contracts between lawyers and 
clients does not differ from the construction of contracts between persons who sustain a 
like fiduciary relation to each other"). 
The law of fiduciary obligation has been developed over the past 400 years by ex-
tending the fiduciary element, which in its earliest form was a part of the law of trusts, to 
persons not acting as trustees. See D. Waters, The Constructive Trust, The Case for a 
New Approach in English Law 3-4 (1964); Jacobson, Capturing Fiduciary Obligation: 
Shepherd's Law of Fiduciaries, 3 Cardozo L. Rev. 519, 524 (1982). The fiduciary obliga-
tion of lawyer to client probably derives from the extension of fiduciary law from trustee/ 
beneficiary to principal and agent. Surprisingly little has been written on the subject of 
fiduciary law, see Jacobson, supra at 519, and even less on the origin of the fiduciary 
nature of the lawyer-client relationship. See Jacobson, The Private Use of Public Author-
ity: Sovereignty and Associations in the Common Law, 29 Buffalo L. Rev. 599, 616 n.48 
(1981). It is likely that, in addition to its derivation from the law of agency, significant 
contributions have been made by the law of equity. Indeed, early American cases have 
imposed what we would now call fiduciary obligations by exclusive reliance on equitable 
principles. See, e.g., Etzel v. Duncan, 112 Md. 346, 76 A. 493,495 (1910); Whitehead v. 
Kennedy, 69 N.Y. 462,466 (1877); 1 J. Story, Equity Jurisprudence§ 311, at 298-300. 
On the transition to fiduciary obligation, see Etzel, 112 Md. at 350-51, 76 A. at 495 (court 
of equity described relation of attorney and client as "quasi fiduciary"). 
20. See Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Freeman, 682 F. Supp. 519, 520 (S.D. Fla. 1988) ("a 
fiduciary relationship may exist under a variety of circumstances, including cases where 
there has been a special confidence reposed in one, who in equity and good conscience, is 
bound to act in good faith and with due regard to the interests of the one reposing the 
confidence"); Black's Law Dictionary 563 (5th ed. 1979) ("A person having duty, created 
by his undertaking, to act primarily for another's benefit in matters connected with such 
undertaking."); see also J . Shepherd, The Law of Fiduciaries 3-11 (1981) (refusing to 
define fiduciary on the alternative grounds that the concept is "intrinsically non-rational" 
and defining it would "rob it of its dynamics and therefore its soul"). 
21. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 5-1, DR 5-105(A) (1982) 
(hereinafter Model Code); Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 2.1 (1983) (herein-
after Model Rules). 
22. See Williams v. Griffin, 35 Mich. App. 179, 183, 192 N.W.2d 283,285 (1971); In 
re Wilson, 81 N.J. 451,455,409 A.2d 1153, 1154-55 (1979); Rosner v. Paley, 65 N.Y.2d 
736, 738, 481 N.E.2d 553, 554, 492 N.Y.S.2d 13, 14 (1985); White v. Whaley, 40 How. 
Pr. 353, 363 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1870). A client's trust in his lawyer is regarded as so vital 
that it forms a theoretical basis for defining the lawyer as fiduciary. See C. Wolfram, 
Modern Legal Ethics § 4.1, at 14 7 ( 1986) ("clients have a right to assume that a lawyer 
who undertakes to listen to them and to render legal assistance can be trusted"). The 
need for trust is also reflected in the ethical requirement that communications to lawyers 
be kept confidential, see Model Code, supra note 21, DR 4-101 , Model Rules, supra note 
21, Rule 1.6, and the corresponding evidentiary privilege, see Fried, The Lawyer as 
Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 Yale L.J. 1060, 1075 
( 1976) (legal institution "exemplifies ... the ideal of personal relations of trust and per-
sonal care which ... are good in themselves"); cf Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-
1 l (1947) (allowing discovery of attorney work-product, which reflects "thoughts" and 
"mental impressions," would have demoralizing effect on legal profession); Brock v. 
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must advance the client's interests as the client would define them if fully 
informed. 23 Acting primarily, if not exclusively, in a client's interest re-
quires undivided loyalty24 and zealous devotion. 25 To fulfill these fiduci-
ary duties, lawyers must inspire their clients' trust and confidence. 26 
A. Client's Right to Discharge 
When a client loses that essential trust and confidence in his lawyer, 
the fiduciary basis of the relationship is undermined. As a precaution 
against this erosive possibility, the client is allowed to terminate the at-
torney-client relationship and agreement at any time, for any reason, 
however arbitrary. 27 It follows, then, that a client cannot be put in a 
worse position by exercising the right to terminate the attorney-client 
agreement. As stated in the leading case, Martin v. Camp,28 imposing a 
Barnes, 40 Barb. 521 (N.Y. App. Div. 1863) (applying fiduciary theory to attorney acting 
as agent for his client); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rubenfeld, 72 Misc. 2d 392, 399, 339 N.Y.S.2d 
623, 632 (Civ. Ct. 1972) (applying fiduciary theory to franchises), aff'd, 77 Misc. 2d 962, 
357 N.Y.S.2d 589 (App. Term. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 48 A.D.2d 428, 370 
N.Y.S.2d 943 (1975), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 936, 358 N.E.2d 882, 390 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1976). 
23. See Model Code, supra note 21, EC 7-8; Model Rules, supra note 21, Rule l.2(a). 
24. See Model Rules, supra note 21, Rule 1.7 comment 1; Fried, supra note 22, at 
1060. See generally Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170(1) (1959) ("The trustee is 
under a duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest of the benefici-
ary."); 2A Scott, The Law of Trusts§ 170 (4th ed. 1987) (duty of loyalty is most funda-
mental duty owed by a fiduciary). 
25. See Model Code, supra note 21, DR 7-101, Canon 7. Other obligations are also 
present. See, e.g., Model Rules, supra note 21, Rule 1.1 (competent legal skill, knowledge 
and preparation); Model Code, supra note 21, DR 6-101(A)(l)-(A)(2) (competence); 
Model Rules, supra note 21, Rule 8.4(c) (candor); Model Code, supra note 21, DR 1-
102(A)(4), 7-101(A)(3) (candor); Model Rules, supra note 21, Rules 1.2-1.4 (candor); 
Model Code, supra note 21, DR 6-101(A)(3) (diligence). 
26. As Francis Bacon once stated: 
The greatest trust between man and man is the trust of giving counsel. For in 
other confidences, men commit the parts of life; their lands, their goods, their 
children, their credit, some particular affair; but to such as they make their 
counsellors, they commit the whole: by how much the whole they are obligated 
to all faith and integrity. 
F . Bacon, Of Counsel, in The Works of Lord Bacon 277 (1846), quoted in Note, Attor-
neys' Trust Accounts: The Bar's Role in the Preservation of Client Property, 49 Ohio St. 
L.J. 275, 275 n. l (1988); see Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170, 173-74, 114 N.E. 46, 47 
(1916) (attorney-client contract different from ordinary employment contracts because of 
"peculiar relation of trust and confidence"). 
27. See In re Dunn, 205 N.Y. 398, 402, 98 N.E. 914, 915-16 (1912); Petty v. Field, 97 
A.D.2d 538, 467 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1983), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 902, 462 N.E.2d 
1201, 474 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1984). An attorney-client relationship based upon principles of 
trust and confidence and the attendant right to discharge is conceptually identical to an 
option contract. The client has a right to buy the lawyer's services for a price, but 
whether to exercise that right is completely at his option. Unlike an option contract, 
however, the client has not given valuable consideration for the option. Instead, the op-
tion is his by virtue of public policy. 
28. 219 N.Y. 170, 174, 114 N.E. 46, 48 (1916). Martin has been adopted by numer-
ous jurisdictions. A list of thirty-four such jurisdictions is set forth in Note, For a Few 
Dollars More: Client's Right to Discharge His Attorney Under a Contingent Fee Contract, 
7 Cardozo L. Rev. 913, 919 n.40 (1986). 
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penalty may deter a client from invoking the right to discharge her attor-
ney. Therefore, when a client discharges his lawyer, the retainer agree-
ment is not breached. Rather, the client simply exercises a contract right 
implied by public policy.29 In fact, a discharged lawyer's recovery upon 
termination by his client is limited to quantum meruit. 30 
B. Codification of Trust 
The fiduciary standard of care owed by a lawyer to a client is elabo-
rated and codified in both the Model Code of Professional Responsibility 
("Model Code") and in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
("Model Rules"). 31 For example, both require preserving the confi-
dences and secrets of a client, 32 avoiding conflicts of interest, 33 acting 
competently,34 representing a client zealously,35 and safeguarding client 
property. 36 
The Model Code's prohibition against "illegal or clearly excessive" 
fees, 37 and the Model Rules' requirement that "fees be reasonable"38 ex-
emplify significant substitutions of the fiduciary standard for that of the 
marketplace. Advance nonrefundable fees for a specific legal service may 
constitute an excessive, unreasonable fee when the client elects to exer-
cise his right to discharge his lawyer before completion of the contem-
plated service. 39 In such a case, a lawyer "cannot rely on the commercial 
29. See Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. at 174, 114 N.E. at 48 ("The discharge of the 
attorney by his client does not constitute a breach of the contract, because it is a term of 
such contract, implied from the peculiar relationship which the contract calls into exist-
ence, that the client may terminate the contract at any time with or without cause."); see 
also Demov, Morris, Levin & Shein v. Glantz, 53 N.Y.2d 553, 428 N.E.2d 387, 444 
N.Y.S.2d 55 (1981). 
30. See In re Ellis, 193 Misc. 956,957, 85 N.Y.S.2d 398,400 (Sup. Ct. 1948) ("If the 
client exercises his right to disc)large the attorney prior to the completion of the services 
for which the fee agreed upon was to constitute compensation, the attorney is not entitled 
to the agreed upon compensation but must take instead the reasonable value of his serv-
ices."), ajf'd, 275 A.D. 767, 88 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1949). 
31. The Model Code and Model Rules are not solely a codification of fiduciary law. 
Some notable exceptions include the sections dealing with advertising, solicitation, and 
unauthorized practice of law, which seek to limit competition in the provision of legal 
services rather than to express a fiduciary standard. See, e.g. , Model Code, supra note 21, 
DR 2-101, 2-102, 2-103, 2-104, 2-105, 3-101, 3-102, 3-103; Model Rules, supra note 21, 
Rules 5.5, 7.2, 7.3. 
32. See Model Code, supra note 21, Canon 4; Model Rules, supra note 21, Rule 1.6. 
33. See Model Code, supra note 21, Canon 5; Model Rules, supra note 21, Rules 1.7, 
1.8, 1.9, 1.10. 
34. See Model Code, supra note 21, Canon 6; Model Rules, supra note 21, Rule 1. I. 
35. See Model Code, supra note 21, Canon 7; Model Rules, supra note 21, Rules 1.2, 
1.3. 
36. See Model Code, supra note 21, DR 9-102, 2-110(A)(2), 2-110(A)(3); Model 
Rules, supra note 21, Rule 1.15. 
37. Model Code, supra note 21 , DR 2-106(A). 
38. Model Rules, supra note 21, Rule 1.5(a). 
39. A nonrefundable retaining fee may be a violation of Model Code DR 2-106 and to 
that extent may not be enforced by a court. See, e.g. , In re Kutner, 78 Ill. 2d 157, 399 
N.E.2d 963 (1979); Jacobs v. Holston, 70 Ohio App. 2d 55, 434 N.E.2d 738 (1980). 
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laws to collect a fee that he has not entirely earned, due to his discharge 
by his client .... [If he could so rely, then commercial laws would be] in 
direct conflict with the ... Code of Professional Responsibility."40 Both 
the Model Code and Model Rules, as codifications of fiduciary law, are 
premised upon the trust-based theory of the attorney-client relationship, 
which requires that the client's discharge right displace commercial con-
tract rules. 
· C. Exceptions to the Discharge Right 
Martin v. Camp provides two exceptions to the trust-based client dis-
charge rule: change of position and the general retainer. The first pro-
vides that when the attorney "has changed his position or incurred 
expense"41 in connection with his representation of a client, he may seek 
contract damages in the event of client breach. Too literal a reading of 
this exception would consume the rule; too narrow a reading would col-
lapse the exception. The exception therefore should be read to equate 
"changed position" with a change in the attorney's employment status:42 
Similarly, "incurred expense" should be limited to expenses not arising in 
the ordinary course of a particular representation.43 These characteriza-
tions coincide roughly with the purported justifications for the second 
exception to the client discharge rule articulated by the Martin court, the 
general retainer exception. 
A general retainer« is an agreement between attorney and client in 
40. Simon v. Metoyer, 383 So. 2d 1321,1323-24 (La. Ct. App.), review denied, 389 So. 
2d 1338 (La. 1980). 
41. Martin v. Camp, 219 N .Y. 170, 176, 114 N.E. 46, 48 (1916). 
42. Thus, for example, a lawyer changes his position when he declines to represent 
buyer A because seller B promises to retain him, or when he resigns from his partnership 
after heir C promises to engage him as a full-time legal advisor. Cf. Jacobson v. Sas-
sower, 113 Misc. 2d 279,286,452 N.Y.S.2d 981, 985-86 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1982) (rejecting 
lawyer's claim of reliance on the nonrefundability of the fee at issue), aff'd per curiam, 
122 Misc. 2d 863, 474 N .Y.S.2d 167 (App. Term. 1983), ajf'd mem., 101 A.D.2d 603, 
483 N.Y.S.2d 711 , ajf'd mem., 66 N .Y.2d 991, 489 N.E.2d 1283, 499 N.Y.S.2d 381 
(1985). 
43. Cf. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1986) (business expenses deductible if incurred in "ordinary" 
course of business). 
44. General retainers are to be distinguished from special retainers, which are agree-
ments between attorneys and clients for the performance of specific legal services for a 
designated fee. See 1 S. Speiser, Attorneys' Fees §§ 1: 17 to :21, at 23-25 ( 1973). The 
distinction between a general retainer and a special retainer is often confused. See Mc-
Clain, The Strange Concept of the Legal Retaining Fee, 8 J. Legal Prof. 123 (1983). 
Notwithstanding this lack of understanding, the general retainer exception is widely fol-
lowed. See California Rules of Professional Conduct 2-111(AX3) ("A member of the 
State Bar who withdraws from employment shall refund promptly any part of a fee paid 
in advance that has not been earned. However, this rule shall not be applicable to a true 
retainer fee which is paid solely for the purpose of insuring the availability of the attorney 
for the matter."); Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n Formal Op. 85-120 (undated), digested in Law. 
Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 901 :7301 ("All non-refundable retainer agreements 
should specify the dollar amount of the retainer and clearly state the time frame in which 
the agreement will exist."). But see Jacobs v. Holston, 70 Ohio App. 2d 55, 59, 434 
N.E.2d 738, 740 (1980) (even a "nonrefundable retaining fee [given] for accepting the 
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which the client agrees to pay a fixed sum to the attorney in exchange for 
the attorney's promise to be available to perform, at an agreed price, any 
legal services that arise during a specified period.45 It is in form an op-
tion agreement. 46 Since the general retainer fee is given in exchange for 
availability, it is a charge separate from fees incurred for services actually 
performed.47 
The general retainer exception to the discharge rule is based on the 
theory that48 attorneys who accept general retainers make two present 
sacrifices at the time of agreement. First, they re-allocate their time so 
that they can stand ready to serve the general retainer client, to the ex-
clusion of other clients.49 Second, they give up their right to be retained 
by persons whose interests conflict with the general retainer client50 and 
thus again forego potential income. 51 
These two justifications are not applicable to all general retainer situa-
tions. First, attorneys rarely turn down work opportunities because their 
plates are already full. 52 Rather they simply pile on more work and jug-
case" may not be enforceable if in violation of DR 2-106's prohibition of charging an 
"illegal or clearly excessive fee"). 
45. See Baranowski v. State Bar, 24 Cal. 3d 153, 164 n.4, 593 P.2d 613, 618 n.4, 154 
Cal. Rptr. 752, 757 n.4 (1979). 
46. Here, of course, valuable consideration does pass. See supra note 27. 
47. The parties may limit the range of legal services to be covered by the general 
retainer agreement. In addition, the parties can create a hybrid general-special retainer 
by agreeing that part or all of the general retainer fee be applied to the bill for any serv-
ices actually performed. See Freund, Skadden, Arps in 40th Year-A Memoir of 'Flom 
Machine', N.Y.L.J., June 18, 1987, at l, col. 3. 
48. See supra note 44. 
49. See Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n Formal Op. 85-120 (undated), digested in Law. Man. 
on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 901:7301. 
50. The conflict-of-interest sacrifice is most apparent among lawyers regarded as in-
valuable experts in particular fields. Clients often retain such specialists to prevent adver-
saries from doing so. For example, Joseph Flom and his law firm, Skadden, Arps, Slate, 
Meagher & Flom, have been seen by many as indispensable advisors in contests for cor-
porate control. See Wilson, Managing/or Success at Skadden, Arps, Int'l Fin. L. Rev. 31 
(Nov. 1984); Freund, supra note 47. Skadden's general retainer agreements typically pro-
vide that the firm will represent the client if it is the target of a hostile takeover, even if 
the raider is also a retainer client. Thus the firm cannot represent (or bill) raider-clients 
in takeover efforts against target-clients. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright 
Corp., No. 78-1295, slip op. at 6 (S.D.N.Y. April 10, 1978) (mem.); J. Stewart, The 
Partners 255 (1983); infra note 55 and accompanying text. 
51. See Blair v. Columbian Fireproofing Co., 191 Mass. 333, 77 N.E. 762 (1906); 
Model Code, supra note 21, DR 5-101 (1982). The conflict-of-interest aspect is illustrated 
by Senator Daniel Webster's refusal to accept clients whose interests were adverse to the 
Bank of the United States, which he represented on a general retainer basis. See Letter 
from Daniel Webster to Nicholas Biddle (Dec. 21, 1833), reprinted in 2 The Papers of 
Daniel Webster, Legal Papers 320 (1983). The conflict, however, did not deter Senator 
Webster from demanding that his retainer be "refreshed" while he served in the U.S. 
Senate and voted on matters involving the Bank. Senator Webster apparently appreci-
ated the potential ramifications of his behavior since he asked Mr. Biddle, the President 
of the Bank, to burn his letters. See id. 
52. During the course of evaluating over 100 federally funded Legal Services pro-
grams, one of the authors has had occasion to interview more than 800 lawyers in small 
firm private practice throughout the United States. One common characteristic of virtu-
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gle their various undertakings, or in the case of large firms, add more 
associates as needed., When they do accept a general retainer, they do 
not set aside time and idly await the moment when their general retainer 
client demands legal services. 53 Even if they did, this time-allocation jus-
tification would merely replicate the change-of-position exception to the 
client discharge rule. 54 Indeed, in situations where the justification is le-
gitimate, such as where the attorney has changed his position, the 
change-of-position exception subsumes the general-retainer/time-alloca-
tion theory. Accordingly, the time allocation theory does not support a 
separate general retainer exception to the client discharge rule. 
Second, not all general retainer clients will yield conflicts that preclude 
a lawyer from representing other potential clients. A lawyer practicing 
in a large metropolitan area who receives a general retainer from a small 
businessman is not likely to be precluded from representing anyone who 
might wish his services. Likewise, a lawyer on a general retainer who 
represents a company that does most or all of its business with govern-
ment agencies is not likely to have a diminished universe of potential 
clients. 55 The foregone representation may be seen as a change-of-posi-
tion and thus is also subsumed by that broader exception to the client 
discharge rule. 
The general retainer exception to Martin v. Camp is further enervated 
by cases raising other issues in which the justifications would have been 
valid-such as where a re-allocation of time was made or a conflict-of-
interest arose-but the attorney's contractual argument failed neverthe-
less. For example, contract clauses prohibiting a client from settling a 
ally all lawyers interviewed is that they had more work to do than time in which to do it. 
On the rare occasion when lawyers did tum down or refer work elsewhere, it was outside 
their area of expertise or not sufficiently remunerative for the effort required. See gener-
ally Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U.L. Rev. I, 60-63 (1988) (lawyers no 
longer devote portion of time to public service or politics; making money is ultimate 
goal). 
53. Lawyers who accept general retainers may be analogized to banks that have un-
used lines of credit. A bank does not keep money lying around awaiting its demand by a 
debtor exercising his credit line. But see Swindell v. First Nat') Bank, 121 Ga. 714, 49 
S.E. 673 (1905). 
54. The broader and more inclusive change-of-position exception is a particular appli-
cation of the reliance principle, the now accepted basis for protecting parties who have 
justifiably and detrimentally relied on promises. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 90 (1981). 
55. In the case of a specialist committed to a specific client, once the lawyer identifies 
a potential conflict between two of.his clients, he must withdraw from representing both, 
unless they consent to the dual representation. See Model Code, supra note 21, DR 5-
105; Model Rules, supra note 21, Rule 1.7. Skad·den's general retainer agreements, how-
ever, typically contain a waiver of the conflict of interest issue that allows the firm to 
represent the target-client even though his adversary is also a client of the firm. See 
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., No. 78-1295, slip op. at 3 (S.D.N.Y. 
April 10, 1978) (mem.); J. Stewart, supra note 51, at 255. Thus, the firm minimizes its 
conflict of interest losses by accepting fees from at least one client. This provision is 
arguably unethical. See Questions About Flom's Retainers, Am. Law., Feb. 1979, at 14, 
col. 1. 
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lawsuit without his lawyer's consent are generally void as against public 
policy. 56 The attorney's contract argument yields because a client's right 
to exercise exclusive control over his property is superior to his lawyer's 
contractual right to fair compensation. Lawyers are not entitled to con-
tract damages when clients violate the settlement restriction because 
such clauses are unenforceable. 57 
Enforcement or denial of a lawyer's contractual rights when a client 
settles a lawsuit without the lawyer's consent is conceptually indistin-
guishable from enforcement or denial of a lawyer's contractual rights 
when a client discharges him. Accordingly, voiding the consent-to-settle 
clause and limiting the lawyer to quantum meruit in the former situation 
requires perforce voiding a nonrefundable retainer and limiting a lawyer 
to quantum meruit in the latter. 58 
The facts of many general retainer cases thus do not satisfy the condi-
tions that justify this exception to the client discharge rule. When the 
conditions are met, the change-of-position exception, as interpreted, suffi-
ciently protects the lawyer's interests. Accordingly, the general retainer 
exception to the client discharge rule is superfluous. 
D. Historic Development 
The trust-based theory of the attorney-client relationship, as it applies 
to the nonrefundable retainer, is still nascent. It originated and evolved 
56. See In re Snyder, 190 N.Y. 66, 82 N.E. 742 (1907); cf Andrewes v. Haas, 214 
N.Y. 255, 258, 108 N.E. 423, 424 (1915) (Cardozo, J.) (the law "will not, under the 
coercion of damages, constrain an unwilling suitor to keep a litigation alive for the profit 
of its officers"). But see Gross v. Russo, 47 A.D.2d 655, 364 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1975) (con-
sent-to-settle provision not void on its face). 
57. See Davis v. Webber, 66 Ark. 190, 200, 49 S.W. 822, 826 (1899). 
58. Additional reasons make the rejection of the nonrefundable retainer more com-
pelling than voiding the consent-to-settle provision. First, as a general policy matter, it is 
more important under fiduciary standards to protect clients' trust in their lawyers than to 
ensure their confidence in the success of a lawsuit. See supra notes 19-40 and accompany-
ing text. The consent-to-settle provision is invalid because it would impose settlement 
costs on parties who would otherwise voluntarily choose to settle, forcing clients to nego-
tiate with their lawyers instead of directly with their adversaries. Similarly, the 
nonrefundable retainer is to be rejected because a client forced to pay for invoking his 
right to discharge is deterred from exercising that right. See Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 
170, 174, 114 N.E. 46, 48 (1916). This point is a fortiori: it is more objectionable to tax a 
right based on disappointed trust in a vital relationship than to tax a right based on 
diminished expectations from a lawsuit. Compare Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 
(1947) (attorney-client privilege indispensable to proper development of attorney-client 
relationship) with]. O'Connell, The Lawsuit Lottery 3-7 (1979) (lawsuits often become 
speculative gambles). Another reason for rejecting nonrefundable retainers relates to the 
purported justifications for the general retainer exception. As noted, only in the most 
unusual general retainer situation will lawyers have re-allocated their time and only in 
some cases will the value of actual opportunities forgone because of conflicts of interest be 
significant. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text. Conversely, the lawyer acting 
under a contract with a consent-to-settle clause has in fact re-allocated his time by per-
forming services in connection with the ongoing case. Further, he is much more likely to 
have declined to represent clients who posed conflicts of interest, because in an active case 
more issues and interests are implicated. 
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in New York, and its subsequent development has been grudging and 
ambiguous. This section traces that development, dividing the history 
into four "periods," defined as much by doctrine as by historical 
happenstance. 
1. Up to Martin v. Camp: Freedom to Discharge 
Early pronouncements59 treated the attorney as any other contracting 
party-he was entitled to collect or retain contractual sums by judicial 
enforcement of his agreements.6() This liberality was later curtailed to 
accommodate the view that lawyers, both as fiduciaries and officers of the 
court, occupied a special position unlike that held by other contracting 
parties.61 The current doctrine arose in the landmark case of Martin v. 
Camp. 62 The Martin court observed that early judicial and statutory 
principles placed the attorney-client relationship on a contractual foot-
ing. 63 The court then redefined these positions on the ground that "the 
peculiar relation of trust and confidence that such a relationship implies 
injects into the contract certain special and unique features." 64 
Accordingly, the Martin court held that clients have an unfettered 
right to discharge their attorneys at will and that this right requires the 
corollary that a client cannot be compelled to pay contract damages 
upon such a dismissal.65 As noted, the Martin court indicated in dictum 
that its theory would not apply where an attorney changed his position66 
or was employed under a general retainer agreement. 67 The Martin 
court's reticence in expounding the meaning and limits of these poten-
tially self-consuming exceptions may have facilitated the occasional lack 
of clarity in subsequent decisions. 
59. Of course, earliest pronouncements forbade lawyers to sue for fees. See Adams v. 
Stevens, 26 Wend. 451, 452 (N.Y . 1841) ("Blackstone lays it down as the established law 
of England, that a counselor cannot sustain a suit for his fees."). 
60. See id. at 456 (rejecting client's argument that attorney's contractual compensa-
tion may not exceed amounts designated in fee bill statutes prescribing sums for specified 
legal services). Adams was later described as expressing substantially the view now em-
bodied in N.Y. Jud. L. § 474 that attorney compensation is "governed by agreement, 
express or implied, which is not restrained by law." Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170, 173, 
114 N.E. 46, 47 (1916) (citing predecessor to section 474 (McKinney 1983)); see infra 
Part II (discussing the meaning of section 474). 
61. See, e.g. , Matter of Dunn, 205 N.Y. 398, 402, 98 N.E. 914, 915-16 (1912) (the 
attorney-client relationship is "so personal and confidential" that it is subject to rules that 
"would not prevail in the case of ordinary contracts"); In re Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67, 83-84 
(1860) (evaluating legislature's authority to regulate attorneys in light of the lawyer's 
position as an officer of the court). 
62. 219 N.Y. 170, 114 N.E. 46 (1916). 
63. See id. at 173, 114 N.E. at 47 (citing Adams v. Stevens, 26 Wend. 451,455 (N.Y. 
1841) and the predecessor to N.Y. Jud. Law § 474 (McKinney 1983)). 
64. Id. 
65. See id. at 174, 114 N.E. at 48; supra notes 27-30, 58 and accompanying text. 
66. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43. 
67. See supra text accompanying notes 44-57 (explaining and rejecting this 
exception). 
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2. Up from Martin v. Camp: The Parties' Intentions 
Four years after Martin, the New York Court of Appeals began its 
inquiry into a nonrefundable retainer case by pondering "what was de-
cided by this court in Martin v. Camp."6 8 Invoking the Martin court's 
statement that its rule was inapplicable to general retainers, the court in 
Greenberg v. Jerome H. Remick & Co. threatened to limit Martin by stat-
ing that it "does not extend to a case where it appears by the express 
terms of the contract or otherwise that a different rule was intended by 
the parties."69 Taken at face value, Martin would have been changed 
from a substantive contract/fiduciary rule into a rebuttable presumption: 
unless the parties agreed differently, the attorney-client contract was ter-
minable by the client without penalty. All that would have been neces-
sary for such an exception to devour the rule was a form retainer 
contract providing that the parties intended that the employment rela-
tionship was not terminable at will by the client. 
It is implausible, however, that the Greenberg court, a scant four years 
later, would dismantle Martin so casually. The Martin court understood 
that it was writing a major opinion that created a rule of law in New 
York that had not before existed and that was contrary to the existing 
rule in Ohio, California, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Texas, and Illi-
nois. 70 In rejecting the rule that allowed the attorney to recover fees 
when the client terminated the relationship without cause, the Martin 
court emphasized that "[t]hese decisions in other jurisdictions are not 
consistent with the principles which define the nature of the contract 
under which an attorney is employed, as those principles have been de-
clared by the decisions of this court."71 Had the Greenberg court in-
tended to hold that Martin had been written in disappearing ink, it would 
have provided at least some recognition of the significance of its holding. 
No such recognition, however, appears in Greenberg.72 
68. Greenberg v. Jerome H. Remick & Co., 230 N.Y. 70, 72, 129 N.E. 211, 211 
(1920). 
69. Id. at 74, 129 N.E. at 212 (dictum). 
70. See Martin , 219 N.Y. at 175, 114 N.E. at 48. 
71. Id. 
72. A change in the composition of the court may have contributed to Greenberg's 
loose language that signaled little deference to Martin. Four of the seven judges had 
changed (Chase, Cardozo, Crane, and Elkins had replaced Seabury, Bartlett, Collin, and 
Cuddleback). Compare Greenberg v. Jerome H. Remick & Co., 230 N.Y. 70, 75, 129 
N.E. 211 , 212 (1920) (treatment of Martin v. Camp) with Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 
N.Y.2d 305, 314, 234 N.E.2d 669, 674, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 640 (1967) (newly-appointed 
Judge Breitel reluctantly concurring to uphold New York's now infamous and unconsti-
tutional Seider doctrine because "[o]nly a major reappraisal by the court, rather than the 
accident of a change in its composition, would justify the overruling of that precedent."). 
Another possible reason Martin did not get the respect from the Greenberg court that it 
deserved is that the Martin opinion was written by Judge Seabury, who resigned to run 
for governor soon after writing it, and who, during the period in which Greenberg was 
decided, was involved in a contentious series of legal debates with Chief Judge Cardozo 
and the rest of the court. See J. Pollard, Mr. Justice Cardozo: A Liberal Mind in Action 
95-99 (1935). 
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Not only was the Greenberg court's apparent appendage to Martin 
overbroad, it was also unnecessary to the Greenberg court's analysis and 
result. Recognizing this, instead of following the command of its all-
consuming exception to ask whether the parties intended that a rule 
other than Martin v. Camp apply, the Greenberg court retreated to in-
quire whether a "professional" contract or an "ordinary" contract had 
arisen. 73 The court reasoned that the agreement, which provided for em-
ployment of the lawyer as attorney and legal advisor for one year for 
$5,200, was an ordinary business agreement because it: (1) did not re-
quire the attorney to "conduct a particular suit or proceeding"; (2) was 
not consummated "in anticipation of expected litigation"; and (3) during 
its term the client "had [not had] any contentious matter, litigated or 
otherwise, requiring the advice or services of an attorney at law." 74 
Thus the court essentially determined that the agreement specified a 
general retainer and therefore met that Martin v. Camp exception. 75 Ac-
cordingly, notwithstanding the court's potentially expansive dicta that 
the parties' intention to displace Martin would be valid, it confined its 
decision to the Martin general retainer exception. In fairness to the 
Greenberg court, therefore, we can conclude that it saw the role of the 
parties' intentions not as determining the validity of the nonrefundable 
retainer itself, but rather as indicating whether a general or special re-
tainer had arisen. 76 
3. Proper Role of the Parties' Intentions 
The intention of the parties analysis, in addition to determining 
whether a general retainer was intended, has also been used to determine 
whether a nonrefundable retainer was intended or whether some part of 
the advance fee had already been earned by the attorney. This subsection 
focuses on two cases that have used intention of the parties analysis am-
biguously, and demonstrates the proper role of such an analysis in deter-
mining the impact of nonrefundable retainers and other devices that 
impose discharge costs on clients. 
In Fellner v. Zuckerberg,77 a client retained a lawyer to handle an an-
73. See Greenberg, 230 N.Y. at 75, 129 N.E. at 212. 
74. Id. at 75, 129 N.E. at 212-13. A general retainer agreement is not a contract for 
the provision of legal services. Legal services are implicated only if a client exercises the 
option he has purchased. See supra note 27. A breach by the attorney of the general 
retainer agreement would not produce the same cause of action as would a breach by the 
attorney providing a legal service to a client. The latter may amount to malpractice while 
the former is compensable in damages as any other breach of contract. Viewed from that 
perspective, a general retainer agreement is an "ordinary business agreement." Green-
berg, 230 N.Y. at 75, 129 N.E. at 212. 
75. See supra notes 44-50, 67 and accompanying text. 
76. Since the distinction in this context between general and special retainers is often 
superfluous, even this dimension of Greenberg does not alter Martin 's broader policy 
mandate. See supra notes 44-58 and accompanying text. 
77. 202 Misc. 122, 109 N.Y.S.2d 50 (City Ct. 1951), rev'd per curiam, 202 Misc. 611, 
118 N.Y.S.2d 470 (Sup. Ct. 1952). 
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nulment and paid the entire fee in advance. During the representation, 
the client reconciled with her spouse and discharged the lawyer. The 
lawyer had earned some of the advance fee, but the record does not dis-
close how much. 78 The lawyer refused to refund anything to the client, 
basing his resistance on "the law of contracts." 79 The trial court rejected 
the lawyer's contention because it fell squarely within the "principle .. . 
enunciated in the leading case of Martin v. Camp."80 Since no exception 
listed in Martin existed in this case, the lawyer was limited to quantum 
meruit. 
The intermediate appellate court, in a sixty-four word per curiam 
opinion without citation to any authority, summarily rejected the trial 
court's disposition as premature. 81 It then announced that "whether the 
[client] is entitled to the return of any part of the fee paid ... depends on 
the intention of the parties when the payment was made, to be deter-
mined from the receipt and all the surrounding circumstances. "82 
This ambiguous language is subject to several interpretations. The 
trial court's rejection of the nonrefundable retainer could be interpreted 
as erroneous because its validity depended on the parties' intentions, 
which the trial court did not consider. This is implausible, however, be-
cause Martin offered no such self-engulfing intention-of-the-parties ex-
ception, 83 and the appellate court did not even cite Greenberg's dictum 
on this point. 84 If it were permissible simply to employ contractual lan-
guage such as "the parties intend that Martin v. Camp shall not apply 
and if client terminates, then lawyer is entitled to retain the advance fee 
paid," the doctrine then would be evanescent. Lawyers would draft and 
use standard forms with such language and most clients would routinely 
sign them. 85 It would be impertinent to ascribe such an intent to either 
78. The trial court indicated that the lawyer had unsuccessfully attempted to recon-
cile the parties and had placed the action on the court calendar. See Fellner, 202 Misc. at 
123, 109 N.Y.S.2d at 51. The court concluded that the reasonable value of the lawyer's 
services was $150, rather than the $275 advance fee figure. See id. at 126, 109 N.Y.S.2d 
at 54. In light of the appellate court's reversal and remand, these findings and the result 
may have ignored the intention of the parties as to how much was to be charged for 
various aspects of the case. See infra text accompanying notes 86-88. 
79. Fellner, 202 Misc. at 124, 109 N.Y.S.2d at 52. 
80. Id. 
81. The judgment was reversed and a new trial ordered. See Fellner, 202 Misc. 611, 
118 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1952). 
82. Id. at 612, 118 N.Y.S.2d at 470-71. 
83. For example, Martin rejected Adams v. Stevens, 26 Wend. 451 (N.Y . 1841), 
which would have focused on the intention of the parties as a matter of contract law. See 
supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
84. See supra notes 69-76. 
85. Such a rule would delegate regulatory power over lawyers to Benders, Blumberg 
and CCH. CJ Jacobson v. Sassower, 113 Misc. 2d 279, 284, 452 N.Y.S.2d 981, 985 
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1982) (taking judicial notice that forms of retainer agreements such as 
the one at issue are "reproduced in l~wyers' handbooks and study aids"), ajf 'd per 
curiam, 122 Misc. 2d 863,474 N.Y.S.2d 167 (App. Term. 1983), ajf'd mem., 107 A.D.2d 
603,483 N.Y.S.2d 711, aff'd mem., 66 N.Y.2d 991,489 N.E.2d 1283, 499 N.Y.S.2d 381 
(1985). 
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New York's Court of Appeals or its Appellate Term. 
More plausibly, the Fellner court may have concluded that the parties' 
intentions should be consulted to determine the extent to which the $275 
advance fee had in fact been earned by the attorney.86 Since the trial 
court record was insufficiently developed to enable the intermediate court 
to answer this question, 87 it remanded for that purpose. This reading 
makes sense of the case. Instead of defying the Court of Appeals and 
flouting Martin, the Fellner court's "intention of the parties" language 
was not relevant to the forfeiture issue at all. Rather, that language ap-
plied only to determining on remand what portion of the advanced fee 
had been earned. 88 
Gross v. Russo 89 supports this explanation of Fellner. In Gross, the 
parties sought a ruling on the validity of a contingency fee retainer agree-
ment executed after the lawyer had performed substantial services. The 
agreement provided that if the client discontinued the case without his 
lawyer's consent, the lawyer's "liquidated damages shall be in the sum of 
$25,000."90 The trial court began its analysis by stating that retainers 
that may be construed as unconscionable must be barred,91 observing 
that Martin stated "the well-established rule that the discharge of an at-
torney does not subject a client to a breach of contract action."92 
The Gross trial court then distinguished the Fellner reversal on the 
ground that "[s]ince the entire fee [in Fellner] was only $275, the Appel-
late Term, in considering the services rendered by the attorney, reversed 
and remanded the action to determine the 'intention of the parties 
• • • • ' "
93 Thus, the Gross trial court considered the purpose of the 
Fellner remand to determine, according to the parties' intentions, what 
portion of the fee had been earned. This reading properly left Martin, 
and the other foundations the Gross court laid for its opinion, 
undisturbed. 
Although not a nonrefundable retainer case, the agreement in Gross 
merits further analysis both because of its functional equivalence and be-
cause it highlights the proper role of the intention of the parties analysis. 
86. For example, the attorney could have set out a fee schedule for the various legal 
events leading to a decree of annulment. 
87. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
88. This interpretation of Fellner is somewhat unsettling, since the intermediate court 
failed to state that on remand the lawyer's compensation should be calculated on a quan-
tum meruit basis and not on the basis of the contract specifying the advance payment. 
Such a quantum meruit evaluation would be based on the reasonable value of the lawyer's 
services in light of what the parties intended. It would, for instance, account for what the 
parties considered the lawyer's services to be worth at the time of contract. See supra 
note 86. 
89. 76 Misc. 2d 441, 351 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Sup. Ct. 1974), rev'd, 47 A.D.2d 655, 364 
N.Y.S.2d 184 (1975). 
90. Gross, 76 Misc. 2d at 441, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 356. 
91. See id. at 442, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 357. 
92. Id. at 443, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 358. 
93. Id. 
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The Gross trial court condemned the "liquidated damages" provision, 
holding it "as a matter of law unconscionable and violative of public pol-
icy" because it would subvert the client's "untrammeled" discharge 
right.94 It found the fact that services were rendered before execution of 
the agreement to be "counterbalanced" by the lawyer's claim that pro-
spective services were then estimable. 95 The court reasoned that if the 
client elected to discharge his lawyer and forego those prospective serv-
ices, he would be forced to pay for services never received.96 Since the 
provision could thus have an unconscionable application by imposing a 
penalty on a client in violation of the Martin v. Camp right to discharge 
rule, the court held it was void on its face and set the case down for trial 
on the quantum meruit basis of the lawyer's claim. 
The Appellate Division agreed that the clause contained "unfortunate 
language" that could be interpreted as a penalty.97 However, it found 
that the language was not fatal because the parties may have intended 
solely to compensate the lawyer for work that he had already done.98 On 
that basis, the provision was not facially void. Emphasizing the fact that 
when the "liquidated damages" clause was executed the lawyer had al-
ready rendered substantial services, the court held that the clause's valid-
ity would depend on the intention of the parties as to the proportionality 
of services rendered to the $25,000 fee claimed. 99 
The court thus observed that the $25,000 could be a discontinuance 
payment for services already rendered rather than "a substantial penalty 
for services that were never rendered." 100 The liquidated sum therefore 
may have been "intended to safeguard the attorney against any 'settle-
ment' which would deprive him of just compensation for services ren-
dered." 101 Thus the court prescribed an inquiry into the parties' 
intentions regarding how much the lawyer had already worked and 
earned. Like the Fellner court, therefore, the Gross court did not say that 
the parties' intentions should dictate the enforceability of their contrac-
tual clause, but rather that they might be relevant in determining how 
much of an agreed-upon fee the lawyer had earned. 102 
4. Clever Lawyers and Mum Courts 
While the lawyers in Fellner and Gross may have lacked familiarity 
with Martin and its exceptions, this was not the case with the attorney in 
94. See id. at 444, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 359. 
95. See id. 
96. See id. 
97. See Gross v. Russo, 47 A.D.2d 655, 655, 364 N.Y.S.2d 184, 185-86 (1975). 
98. See id. 
99. See id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. For a less gracious interpretation of the Gross court's description of the "liqui-
dated damages" provision as "unfortunate language," see infra notes 190-92 and accom-
panying text. 
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Jacobson v. Sassower. 103 In Jacobson, the attorney sought to convert a 
representation properly denominated as a special retainer into a general 
retainer104 and thus to legitimate a forfeiture provision contained in that 
agreement. In a dramatic example of the delicacy of this problem, the 
trial court's refusal to endorse the lawyer's effort was affirmed in short-
hand opinions by all three courts up New York's appellate ladder. 105 
The client in Jacobson retained a "well-known, highly regarded matri-
monial lawyer" to represent him in a divorce proceeding. 106 The retainer 
agreement specified compensation at an hourly fee of $100 to be paid as 
billed plus a "non-refundable retainer of $2,500" payable upon com-
mencement of the relationship that would "be credited against . . . 
charges." 107 After insurmountable friction developed between the attor-
ney and client, the client discharged the lawyer and demanded return of 
the unearned portion of the $2,500 advance fee pursuant to the Model 
Code. 108 The lawyer refused this demand on the ground that the terms 
of the contract made that $2,500 nonrefundable. 
The trial court disagreed with the lawyer, holding on several alterna-
tive grounds that no valid nonrefundable retainer existed and ordering a 
refund of the unearned portion of the $2,500 advance fee. Of the court's 
two principal grounds, 109 the first ground tracks the analysis developed 
in this Article based on Martin's trust-based theory of the attorney-client 
relationship. The court articulated the Martin principles, 110 identified 
the general retainer exception based on Greenberg, 111 and found that the 
103. 113 Misc. 2d 279, 452 N. Y.S.2d 981 (N. Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1982), aff 'd per curiam, 122 
Misc. 2d 863, 474 N.Y.S.2d 167 (App. Term. 1983), aff'd mem., 107 A.D.2d 603, 483 
N.Y.S.2d 711, aff'd mem., 66 N.Y.2d 991, 489 N.E.2d 1283, 499 N.Y.S.2d 381 (1985). 
104. For a discussion of the distinction between special and general retainers, see supra 
notes 44-47 and accompanying text. 
105. See supra note 103. 
106. See Jacobson, 113 Misc. 2d at 279, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 982. 
107. Id. at 280, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 982. 
108. See Model Code, supra note 21, DR 2-110(B)(4) (lawyer shall withdraw from 
employment if discharged by his client); id. , DR 2-110(A)(3) (withdrawing lawyer shall 
refund to his client unearned advance fee payments); see also Brickman, The Advance Fee 
Payment Dilemma: Should Payments Be Deposited to the Client Trust Account or to the 
General Office Account?, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. (forthcoming) (1989) (analyzing these 
Model Code provisions and DR 9-102). 
109. Apart from the court's two holdings discussed in the text, another noteworthy 
ground of its decision was Model Code DR 2-110(B)(4) and DR 2-110(A)(3). Jacobson 
v. Sassower, 113 Misc. 2d 279,284,452 N.Y.S.2d 981,984 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1982), aff'd 
per curiam, 122 Misc. 2d 863, 474 N.Y.S.2d 167 (App. Term. 1983), aff'd mem., 107 
A.D.2d 603, 483 N.Y.S.2d 711, aff'd mem. , 66 N.Y.2d 991 , 489 N.E.2d 1283, 499 
N.Y.S.2d 381 (1985). If nonrefundable retainers are invalid, then under DR 2-110(A)(3) 
any unearned portion of an advance fee must be returned to the client. But does DR 2-
110(A)(3) substantively state that charging a nonrefundable retainer violates that section? 
Arguably, "if an attorney is prohibited from keeping any part of a pre-paid fee that has 
not been earned because of his discharge by his client, he is also prohibited from collect-
ing any part of a fee that he has not earned for that reason." Simon v. Metoyer, 383 So. 
2d 1321 , 1323 (La. App. 1980); see supra notes 31-40 and accompanying text. 
110. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text. 
111 . See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text. 
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lawyer's effort at establishing a general retainer had failed. 112 In sum, 
the court found "the practice of charging advance 'nonrefundable' fees 
(to be] a bald attempt to circumvent the rule limiting an attorney's recov-
ery upon discharge to quantum meruit." 113 
The trial court also grounded its rejection of the nonrefundable re-
tainer in the agreement's ambiguity. Its analysis assumed arguendo that 
the intention of the parties was relevant, 114 and found that the agreement 
would not alert "the average matrimonial client ... that he was agreeing 
to a possible forfeiture of his advance payment." 115 Further, the contract 
contained "no explicit language designating the $2,500 as a 'minimum 
fee.' " 116 Accordingly, the client could not have intended a forfeiture 
provision since he could not have understood the contract language to 
describe one. 
This alternative holding on ambiguity (or "procedural unconscionabil-
ity") 117 was seized by both the Appellate Division and by the Court of 
Appeals to affirm the trial court. 118 Apart from its misconception of the 
role of the parties' intentions in evaluating nonrefundable retainers, the 
principal oddity of this unanimity is that the case presented a rare oppor-
tunity for judicial review of a critical attorney-client issue. 119 As the trial 
court's comprehensive opinion indicates, the case presented a wealth of 
issues for resolution: generally, whether nonrefundable retainers are 
112. See Jacobson v. Sassower, 113 Misc. 2d 279, 285, 452 N.Y.S.2d 981, 985 (N.Y.C. 
Civ. Ct. 1982), ajf'd per curiam, 122 Misc. 2d 863, 474 N.Y.S.2d 167 (App. Term. 1983), 
ajf'd mem., 107 A.D.2d 603, 483 N.Y.S.2d 711, ajf'd mem., 66 N.Y.2d 991,489 N.E.2d 
1283, 499 N.Y.S.2d 381 (1985). The court reached this conclusion by observing that an 
hourly charge was to be offset against the advance payment and that the lawyer was to 
represent the client "for a period of unspecified duration in connection with a particular 
legal matter." Id. at 283, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 984. 
113. Jacobson, 113 Misc. 2d at 282,452 N.Y.S.2d at 983 (citing Martin v. Camp, 219 
N.Y. 170, 114 N.E. 46 (1916)). 
114. See id. at 285, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 985 (citing Fellner v. Zuckerberg, 202 Misc. 611, 
612, 118 N.Y.S.2d 470, 470-71 (App. Term. 1952)); supra notes 77-102 and accompany-
ing text (intention of parties relevant to amount of advance fee earned and to whether 
general retainer was intended, but not to legitimacy of nonrefundable retainer itself). 
115. Jacobson, 113 Misc. 2d at 285, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 985. 
116. Id. 
117. See Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 485, 487 (1967); see also Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N .J. 358, 404, 161 
A.2d 69, 95 (1960) (failure to call buyer's attention to exculpatory clause). 
118. The Appellate Term, the first appellate court to review the trial judge, affirmed 
substantially on the ground of the trust-based theory of the attorney-client relationship, 
viewing as "unenforceable any contractual provision which constrains a client from exer-
cising his right to freely discharge his attorney ... [and that] the larger the amount of the 
so-called 'nonrefundable' retainer, the more securely is the client held hostage to that 
payment." Jacobson v. Sassower, 122 Misc. 2d 863, 866, 474 N.Y.S.2d 167, 169 (App. 
Term. 1983), ajf'd mem., 107 A .D.2d 603,483 N.Y.S.2d 711, ajf'd mem. , 66 N.Y.2d 
991 , 489 N.E.2d 1283, 499 N.Y.S.2d 381 (1985). 
119. The opportunity was rare not because the underlying issues arise infrequently, but 
because the parties rarely air these grievances in court. Cf Jacobson v. Sassower, 113 
Misc. 2d at 284, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 985 ("this retainer agreement is commonly used 
throughout the New York City metropolitan area"). 
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facially void; whether the general retainer exception120 endures; the im-
pact of the Model Code on these rules; 121 the role of the parties' inten-
tions and the meanings of Fellner 122 and Gross; 123 the relevance of 
section 474; 124 and the scope of the change-of-position exception. 125 
It was not a lack of imagination that caused these appellate courts to 
tunnel their vision to the unexciting and nondispositive issue of proce-
dural unconscionability; on that issue each of the courts took a slightly 
different position. The Appellate Division, in a brief memorandum opin-
ion, affirmed, finding that the" 'nonrefundable' retainer agreement [was] 
ambiguous," and unenforceable, because ambiguity should be construed 
against the lawyer-drafter. 126 Then it adopted the Gross position, stating 
that the retainer's enforceability in any case "should depend on a 'full 
exploration of all the facts and circumstances' " including the parties' 
intentions and the proportionality of the fees to the services. 127 Presuma-
bly referring to the general retainer and change-of-position exceptions, 
the court concluded that "[s]uch retainers, while not to be encouraged, 
are not, in all cases, unenforceable as a matter of law." 128 
The Court of Appeals began its memorandum opinion using the kind 
of ambiguous language that yielded defeat for the losing attorney: "A 
client may always discharge his attorney, with or without cause, and in 
the absence of a contract providing otherwise an attorney discharged 
without cause is entitled to be compensated in quantum meruit." 129 It is 
challenging to discern what the court meant by this "absence of a con-
tract providing otherwise" phrase, especially because it then cited Mar-
tin. The only logical and honest reading of the full sentence is to accept 
the "contract providing otherwise" phrase as an imprecise reference to 
Martin's general retainer and change-of-position exceptions. If the court 
intended anything broader it would have cited Greenberg v. Jerome H. 
Remick & Co., 130 in addition to or instead of Martin, which it pointedly 
did not do. Greenberg can much more easily be fitted for the proposition 
that the parties' contractually expressed intentions are important. 
Equally telling is the court's omission of any reference to the Appellate 
120. See supra notes 44-58 and accompanying text. 
121. See supra notes 108-09. 
122. See supra notes 77-88 and accompanying text. 
123. See supra notes 89-102 and accompanying text. 
124. N .Y . Jud. Law§ 474 (McKinney 1983); see infra Part II. 
125. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. 
126. See Jacobson v. Sassower, 107 A.D.2d 603, 603, 483 N.Y.S.2d 711 , 711 , aff'd 
mem., 66 N.Y.2d 991,489 N.E.2d 1283, 499 N.Y.S.2d 381 (1985). 
127. See id. at 603, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 712 (dictum) (citing Gross v. Russo, 47 A.D.2d 
655,655, 364 N.Y.S.2d 184, 186 (1975)); supra notes 81-102 and accompanying text (in-
tention of parties relevant to amount of advance fee earned but not to legitimacy of the 
nonrefundable retainer itself). 
128. Jacobson, 107 A.D.2d at 603, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 712. 
129. Jacobson, 66 N.Y.2d at 993, 489 N.E.2d at 1284, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 382 (citing 
Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170, 114 N.E. 46 (1916)). 
130. 230 N.Y. 70, 129 N.E. 211 (1920). 
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Division's citation to Gross v. Russo131 for the proposition that the inten-
tion of the parties should control. These citation omissions make the 
court's perpetuation of ambiguity particularly inexplicable. 132 
In any case, the court declared the nonrefundable retainer unenforce-
able because it suffered from procedural unconscionability-"it did not 
state clearly that ... [it] was intended to be a minimum fee and that the 
entire sum would be forfeited" upon termination. 133 The court placed 
the burden on the lawyer, indicating that she "was required to establish 
that [the client] understood that those were the terms of the agreement 
and she failed to do so." 134 The court concluded its opinion with this 
final ambiguity: "In view of this disposition, it is not necessary to reach 
[the client's] further contention that nonrefundable retainer agreements 
are against public policy and, therefore, void." 135 
The Jacobson court thus neither undermined nor reaffirmed Martin. 
Rather, it enigmatically left Martin intact, Greenberg a remotely poten-
tial detractor, and the client with the right to void a nonrefundable re-
tainer clause. 
II. LA WYERS' COMPENSATION AS UNRESTRAINED BY LAW 
Arguably, nonrefundable retainers could be justified pursuant to sec-
tion 474 of New York's Judicial Code, 136 which has been adopted in sub-
stantially similar form in many states. 137 Section 474 provides that 
attorney compensation is "governed by agreement, express or implied, 
which is not restrained by law." 138 Read literally, the statute appears to 
mean that if a lawyer contracts for a nonrefundable retainer, he is enti-
tled to have it enforced. Literal interpretation of the statutory language, 
however, is inconsistent with judicial doctrine treating the attorney-client 
contract as an aspect of fiduciary law. 139 This Part discusses section 
131. 76 Misc. 2d 441, 351 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Sup. Ct. 1974), rev'd, 47 A.D.2d 655, 364 
N.Y.S.2d 184 (1975). 
132. See supra note 119. 
133. Jacobson, 66 N.Y.2d at 993, 489 N.E.2d at 1284, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 382. 
134. Id. ; Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J . 358, 403-04, 161 A.2d 69, 94-
95 (1960). 
135. Jacobson, 66 N.Y.2d at 994, 489 N.E.2d at 1284-85, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 382. 
136. N.Y. Jud. Law§ 474 (McKinney 1983). 
137. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code§ 1021 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988); Idaho Code§ 3-
205 (1979); Minn. Stat. § 549.01 (1988); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 484.130 (1959); Mont. Code 
Ann. § 37-61-420 (1987); N.D. Cent. Code§ 28-26-01 (1974 & Supp. 1987); S.D. Codi-
fied Laws Ann. § 15-17-6 (1984); Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-41 (1987); Va. Code.§ 3201 
(1890) (discussed in Thomas v. Turner's Administrator, 87 Va. 1, 5, 12 S.E. 149, 153 
(1890)); Wash. Rev. Code§ 4.84.010 (1988). One court specifically recognized the origin 
of its state's statute: "Section 1 of this [Missouri] statute is an exact copy of section 66 
[the precursor to § 474) of the New York Code .... " Curtis v. Met. St. Ry., 118 Mo. 
App. 341 , 349, 94 S.W . 762, 764 (1906); see also C. Wolfram, supra note 19, § 9.1, at 496-
97 n.4 ("[S)tatutes . .. found in several states . . . declare that the measure of a lawyer's 
compensation is to be fixed by the client-lawyer agreement ."). 
138. N.Y. Jud. Law§ 474 (McKinney 1983); see supra note 14. 
139. See supra Part I A-B. Moreover, the adoption of the Model Code of Professional 
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474's legislative history and its later interpretations. It offers a more his-
torically accurate depiction of the statute's meaning and function that is 
not inhibited by a literal interpretation and that reconciles judicial treat-
ment of the statutory language. Accordingly, this Part rejects the con-
tract-based theory of attorney-client relationships in favor of the trust-
based theory developed in Part I. 
A. Fee Bill Statutes 
The first effort to regulate attorneys' fees in New York occurred in 
1658 when Peter Stuyvesant proclaimed a prohibition against lawyers 
charging excessive fees. 140 That fee bill specified that lawyers would be 
entitled to specified amounts as payment for performing defined tasks. 
Through 1813, fee bills prescribed the total compensation to which a 
lawyer would be entitled, including both the attorney-client contract 
rates ("fees") and the litigation costs recoverable by the winning party 
("costs"). 141 Thus, the fee statutes purported to declare that the specified 
recoverable costs were the full measure of the lawyer's compensation. 142 
Thereafter, fee bills began to blur the distinction between fees and 
costs, 143 and courts began to allow lawyers to recover fees based on 
agreements even where the agreed upon fee exceeded the prescribed 
costs. 144 Post-1823 fee bills 145 did not seek to control what courts could 
allow as recoverable costs, but to prescribe what an attorney could 
charge his client. Those fee bills stated, for example, that a lawyer could 
charge two dollars for "[p]erusing and amending interrogatories" and 
one dollar for "[d]rawing a demurrer or joinder in demurrer." 146 Lawyer 
income thus became a function of court filings and "the prominence and 
practice of a lawyer was judged by the number of writs he sued out, or to 
Responsibility by the Appellate Divisions of New York's court system, and by other 
states, would have been precluded since several sections regulate the inception of the 
attorney-client relationship and the fees to be charged. See, e.g., Model Code, supra note 
21, DR 2-103, 2-104, 2-106, 2-l lO(A)(3), 5-101, 5-104, 6-101, 9-102. 
140. See l C. Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 458 (1906). 
141. See 1813 N.Y. Laws ch. 83 ("no officer ... shall exact, demand or ask, or be 
allowed [any fee greater than prescribed]"). 
142. See Davenport v. Ludlow, 4 How. Pr. 337, 338 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850) (referring to 
function of fee bills prior to repeal). 
143. 3 N.Y. Rev. Stat. (1829) ("For the following services . .. the following fees shall 
be allowed."); see also In re Bleakley, 5 Paige Ch. 311 (N.Y. Ch. 1835). 
144. This practice may have been more widespread than many thought. See Adams v. 
Stevens, 23 Wend. 57 (N.Y. 1840), ajf'd, 26 Wend. 448 (N.Y . 1841) (historically, law-
yers' fees have been allowed to exceed recoverable costs); Adams, 26 Wend. at 458 (quot-
ing Chancellor Kent as believing in 1828 that "no Fee-Bill ever did or ever can 
remunerate the solicitor or counsel for one half their services. A great part of that burden 
always falls on their own clients."). These views were later described as expressing sub-
stantially the same view as section 474 of New York's Judicial Code. See Martin v. 
Camp, 219 N.Y. 170, 173, 114 N.E. 46, 47 (1916). 
145. See, e.g. , 1840 N.Y. Laws ch. 386; 1829 N.Y. Rev . Stat. tit. III, ch. 10. 
146. 1840 N.Y. Laws ch. 386. 
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which he appeared." 147 
B. Reform 
In the mid-nineteenth century, David Dudley Field and other reform-
ers were engaged by the state of New York to address the unnecessary 
procedural complexities that resulted from the dual system of equity and 
law, which often denied meritorious claimants victory by archaic insis-
tence on obsolete formalism. 148 The reform movement culminated in 
New York's 1846 constitution, which, in tum, led to the Field Code of 
1848. 149 Part of the reform effort focused on attorney compensation and 
began by rejecting two principles that undergirded the fee bill statutes 
through 1848. First, Field criticized the fact that compensation de-
pended on "the number or length of proceedings."150 The fee bills were 
unacceptable because they encouraged "multiplication of the processes" 
and fees were "not proportioned to the real labor performed." 151 Sec-
ond, the reformers rejected "the right of the state, to interfere between 
citizens ... [or] to make bargains for the people or to regulate prices." 152 
Field and his colleagues took the position that lawyers are not public 
officers, but rather act "for private purposes, and on behalf of private 
persons." 1:;3 Hence, state regulation of lawyers' fees was considered an 
unwarranted intrusion. 154 
Field agreed with one purpose of the existing attorney compensation 
system: to require the losing party to pay the winning party's fees. m 
That traditional rule on attorneys' fees, now known as the "English 
rule," 156 had been evaporating because the fees an attorney charged his 
client frequently exceeded considerably the costs the winner recovered 
from his adversary. Judicial determination that lawyers had the right to 
enter into enforceable attorney-client agreements permitted this gap to 
grow, and where agreements were not enforced, the awarding of quan-
tum meruit instead of the statutory "costs" further widened the gulf. 157 
As recoverable costs became an increasingly smaller proportion of fees 
147. H. Scott, The Courts of the State of New York 217-18 (1909); see 1 A. Chester, 
Legal and Judicial History of New York 73-74 (1911) (purpose of the fee bill ordinance 
was to prevent common practice of notaries overcharging clients). 
148. See J. Hazard, Civil Procedure§ 1.6, at 17-18 (3d ed. 1985). 
149. See First Report of the Commissioners on Practice and Pleadings, New York 
Code of Procedure 204, Title X (1848) (hereinafter First Report of the Commissioners). 
150. Id. at 205. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 204. 
153. Id. at 205. 
154. But see In re Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67, 84 (1860) (lawyers are officers of the court and 
subject to judicial supervision); 6 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 434-35 
( 1927) (In English history, lawyers were officers of t~e court and were regulated by stat-
ute and court order.); C. Wolfram, supra note 19, at 17-19 (same). 
155. See First Report of the Commissioners, supra note 149, at 206. 
156. See Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule, 47 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 9, 12-13 (1984). 
157. See id. at 16. 
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charged, the "American rule" emerged, requiring that each party pay his 
own attorneys' fees. 158 Field sought to limit this trend toward the Amer-
ican rule and to restore the English rule through a statutory scheme of 
indemnity under which prevailing parties could recover legal expenses 
from their adversaries. 
Field's strategy to eliminate multiplicative proceedings and to mini-
mize state involvement while retaining the English rule was to abolish 
the fee bill system and to treat lawyers just like other professionals: "to 
enforce the contracts made by (them]" 159 and, in addition, to require by 
statute that losing parties pay the winners' fees. The statute that Field 
drafted to achieve his objectives provided: 
Section 258. All statutes establishing or regulating the costs or fees of 
attorneys, solicitors and counsel in civil actions, and all existing rules 
and provisions of law, restricting or controlling the right of a party to 
agree with an attorney, solicitor or counsel, for his compensation, are 
repealed; and hereafter the measure of such compensation shall be left 
to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties. But there may be 
allowed to the prevailing party, upon the judgment, certain sums by 
way of indemnity, for his expenses in the action; which allowances are 
in this act termed costs. 160 
This statute consists of three parts. The first part, up to the first semi-
colon, was a reaction to the excessive and frivolous pleadings that the fee 
bills generated. It repealed all prior fee bills. The second part, the re-
mainder of the first sentence, redundantly provided that attorney fees 
were no longer governed by statute, but rather by contract law. The 
third part, the second sentence, was a response to the transformation 
from the English to the American rule and the vast differences between 
costs and fees. It stated that section 258 was to govern costs recoverable 
by the prevailing litigant from his adversary. This simple analysis has 
been complicated by subsequent revisions of the statute. 
C. Subsequent Statutory Revisions 
The 1851 Code of Procedure contained identical language to section 
258 on all three points.161 However, in 1876, the statute was revised. 162 
The first part of section 258 was deleted because the fee bills had already 
been repealed in 1848. The second part, although it was superfluous 
when originally enacted, was retained, and to it was added the language 
"unrestrained by law." That language was simply a reference to and a 
158. See id. 
159. First Report of the Commissioners, supra note 149, at 206 ("[R]elations between 
the client and the lawyer [must be] left free so that they may make whatever contract they 
please."). 
160. 1848 N.Y. Laws § 258. 
161. 1851 N.Y. Code of Procedure§ 303. 
162. See 1876 N.Y. Code of Remedial Justice § 66, at 13. 
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replacement for the deleted words of repeal. 163 Thus, the New York 
Code of Remedial Justice in 1876 set forth the language that appears 
today, 164 declaring only that "compensation of an attorney ... is gov-
erned by agreement, express or implied, which is not restrained by 
law." 165 
These subsequent re-adoptions of section 258 of the Field Code were 
technically improper because the repeal no longer stated anything sub-
stantive. 166 Nevertheless, the progeny of section 258 erroneously has 
163. The third part, regarding costs, was also deleted, presumably because the Ameri-
can rule had by then become enshrined in practice. See id. It is ironic that Field's at-
tempt to restore the primacy of the English rule should have led to its demise. 
164. See N.Y. Jud. Law§ 474 (McKinney 1983) (attorney compensation is "governed 
by agreement, express or implied, which is not restrained by law"). The same language 
appeared in all statutory revisions between 1899 and today: 1899 Laws of New York ch. 
61, § 66; 1909 Laws of New York ch. 35; 1912 Laws of New York ch. 229, § 474; 1947 
Laws of New York ch. 366, § 474; 1962 Laws of New York ch. 310, § 231. 
165. N.Y. Jud. Law § 474 (McKinney 1983). 
166. This lack of substance was recognized by one court: 
Plaintiff puts much reliance upon [what is now§ 474 of the Judiciary Law], 
which provides that an attorney's compensation is governed by agreement, 
"which is not restrained by law," which he understands to include a prohibition 
against its supervision in equity. But that this language .. . was not intended to 
vary the meaning of the old Field Code of Procedure is shown by the revisers' 
own declaration. In Appendix B to their report, containing a list of the sections 
in which the law is amended, they omit [what is now§ 474), thus relegating it 
to the class of redrafts "whose sole object is to conform the syntax of the terms 
used to those of other portions of the bill, to prune down redundant expressions, 
or otherwise to attain greater simplicity and clearness without material change 
of the meanings." ... The present words "which is not restrained by law" 
replace a provision of the [Field] Code . .. § 258 ... which repealed all then 
existing statutes regulating attorney's fees, together with "all existing rules and 
provisions of law restricting or controlling the right of a party to agree with an 
attorney ... for his compensation" ... and the object of the codifiers was to give 
the attorney the same right of contract "as in respect to every other professional 
person." (Report of the Code Commissioners, 1848, pp. 204-205). The juris-
diction of equity over persons in confidential relations stood untouched. 
Ransom v. Ransom, 70 Misc. 30, 38-39, 127 N.Y.S. 1027, 1033-34 (Sup. Ct. 1910), rev'd 
on other grounds, 147 A.D. 835, 133 N .Y.S. 173 (1911). In Ransom, the lower court 
reduced the attorney's contingent fee from one third to 7.5 percent because the attorney 
had misrepresented the risk involved in the litigation. The appellate court reversed, up-
holding the fee. As for the lower court's analysis of section 258 of the Field Code, the 
appellate court vigorously attacked a straw man. It held that the lower court's view 
would render it useless for an attorney to enter a contract fixing his fee because it would 
always be subject to revision by a court or jury. See Ransom, 147 A.D. at 849, 133 
N.Y.S. at 183. This reasoning vastly overstates the import of the fiduciary standard. The 
lower court's analysis of the legislative history, quoted above, is accurate. 
The appellate court nevertheless went on to say that 
it cannot be said, even in view of the plain phraseology of the Code section, that 
the court is without power to inquire into the good faith of an agreement be-
tween attorney and client .... But . .. their agreement should not be set aside 
unless fraud has been perpetrated, undue influence exerted, material facts affect-
ing the subject-matter misrepresented, suppressed, or advantage taken of a posi-
tion of confidence and trust to obtain an unconscionable advantage over the 
party. 
Id. at 848, 133 N.Y.S. at 182. This is a position midway between the fiduciary and the 
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been accepted as a new feature of the legal landscape, 167 instead of being 
recognized, after the first adoption, as a nonf eature. 
As noted, section 258 repealed statutory interference with the pricing 
of lawyer-client agreements. 168 Field's admonition on this point (con-
tained in the first sentence of section 258, following the semi-colon) was 
obviously precatory, but was intended to influence future legislatures not 
to revive fee bills. Of course, later legislatures could do so no matter 
what the statute said because the restraint is not part of the state's consti-
tution. In the end, Field's drafting was successful because revisors re-
tained that precatory expression of legislative restraint. 
What the Code and its successors did not say, however, was that the 
judiciary's role in supervising attorney-client agreements was to be di-
minished or altered in any way. 169 To the contrary, by employing the 
language "express or implied," the statute necessarily contemplated obli-
gations being created by judicial doctrine in the absence of an express 
promise to pay. 170 Moreover, the word "law" in the phrase "unre-
strained by law" obviously referred only to stautory law. Indeed, section 
474 and its counterparts in other states generally are not perceived as 
restricting the scope of judicial review of attorney-client contracts, 171 es-
contract standard and belies the court's statutory analysis. If the statute is to be read 
literally, then how can an attorney's fee contract be undone because of a breach of trust 
and confidence unless such a fiduciary obligation exists? The practical effect of the appel-
late court's opinion is to reverse the burden of proof placed on the attorney by the lower 
court to prove that the fee contract was made in good faith and to place the burden on the 
client to show a lack of good faith. But see Committee on Legal Ethics v. Tatterson, 352 
S.E.2d 107, 113 (W. Va. 1986) ("The burden of proof is upon the attorney to show the 
reasonableness and fairness of the contract for the attorney's fee."). 
167. See, e.g., Morton v. Forsee, 249 Mo. 409,427, 155 S.W. 765, 770, 772 (1913); In 
Re Fitzsimons, 174 N.Y. 15, 23, 66 N.E. 554, 557 (1903); Fischer-Hansen v. Brooklyn 
Heights R.R., 173 N.Y. 492,497, 66 N.E. 395,396 (1903); Ransom v. Cutting, 112 A.D. 
150, 152, 98 N.Y.S. 282, 284 (1906), ajf'd, 188 N.Y. 447, 81 N.E. 324 (1907); Werner v. 
Knowlton, 107 A.D. 158, 161, 94 N.Y.S. 1054, 1057 (1905); Friedman v. Mindlin, 91 
Misc. 473, 477, 155 N.Y.S. 295, 298 (N.Y.C. City Ct. 1915). A more correct analysis of 
the impact of section 258, though not of its historical derivation, is set out in Gair v. 
Peck, 6 N .Y.2d 97, 124, 160 N.E.2d 43, 59, 188 N.Y.S.2d 491, 512 (1959) (Froessel, J., 
dissenting), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 374 (1960). 
168. See First Report of the Commissioners, supra note 149, at 204 (state has no right 
"to make bargains for the people or to regulate prices"); see also Martin v. Camp, 219 
N.Y. 170, 173, 114 N.E. 46, 47 (1916) ("Notwithstanding the fact that the employment 
of an attorney by a client is governed by the contract which the parties make, the peculiar 
relation of trust and confidence that such a relationship implies injects into the contract 
certain special and unique features."). 
169. See Barry v. Whitney, 3 Sand. Ch. 696, 698 (N.Y. Ch. 1851) ("Before the [Field] 
code, the court had the general power of examining into [attorney-client] bargains ... to 
see that they were not unreasonable or oppressive, and the power has not been taken 
away."). 
170. For example, the court could determine that an implied-in-fact contract arose 
where a client, absent an express agreement, actually requested services but then refused 
to pay because he had not so promised. See Lampleigh v. Brathwait, 80 Eng. Rep. 255 
(C.P. 1615); 1 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 19, at 44-50 (1963); 1 S. Williston, 
Contracts § 3A, at 12-15 (3d ed. 1957). 
171. See, e.g., Eriksson v. Boyum, 150 Minn. 192, 184 N.W. 961 (1921); Beals v. Wag-
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pecially not of contingent fee contracts. 172 Hence, the statute does not 
erect a regime of free contractual bargaining between attorney and client 
insulated from judicial review or fiduciary standards. Having spent itself 
in the fee bill repeal, section 474 survives, devoid of all substantive con-
tent, to discourage legislative intervention into a fee bargaining process 
still tempered by judicial superintendence. As properly analyzed in this 
Article, section 474 is a mere shadow of history awaiting a statutory revi-
sion to delete it from the current codes. 
III. A TIORNEY-CLIENT AGREEMENTS AND CONTRACT LAW 
The analysis in Part I of this Article established the proposition that 
nonrefundable retainers are incompatible with trust-based client dis-
charge rights. Part II rejected the argument that section 474 and its ana-
logues in other states require that attorney-client relationships be 
governed by commercial contract rules. This Part assumes arguendo 
that the arguments in Parts I and II have failed, and that the contract 
theory of the attorney-client relationship prevails over the trust-based 
theory. Fiduciary principles are thus laid aside, trust is ignored, and 
nonrefundable retainers are considered from a traditional contract per-
spective. 173 Even from this contract perspective, however, the 
nonrefundable retainer fails to pass muster. 
Parties to a contract are permitted to include clauses in their agree-
ments that supplant judicially determined remedies for breach. 174 Thus 
ener, 47 Minn. 489, 50 N.W. 535 (1891); Coleman v. Sisson, 71 Mont. 435, 230 P. 582 
(1924); Haight v. Moore, 5 Jones & S. 161 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1874); Barry v. Whitney & 
Tucker, 3 Sand. 696 (N.Y. Ch. Ct. 1851); Moran v. Simpson, 42 N.D. 575, 173 N.W. 769 
(1919); Egan v. Bumight, 34 S.D. 473, 149 N .W. 176 (1914); Ashton v. Skeen, 85 Utah 
489, 39 P.2d 1073 (1935). In Ransom v. Ransom, 70 Misc. 30, 41, 127 N.Y.S. 1027, 1035 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1910), rev'd, 147 A.O. 835, 133 N.Y.S. 173 (1911) (discussed supra note 
166), the court again hit the nail on the head: "Upon reviewing all the authorities [regard-
ing the effect of section 258 of the Field Code,] I do not find any that diminish the force of 
the ancient rules of chancery affecting contracts between persons in confidential rela-
tions." See also Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465,477, 162 N.E. 487, 492 (1928); Martin v. 
Camp, 219 N.Y. 170, 173, 114 N.E. 46, 47 (1916); Gross v. Russo, 76 Misc. 2d 441,442, 
351 N.Y.S.2d 355, 357 (Sup. Ct. 1974), rev'd, 47 A.D.2d 655, 364 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1975); 
Albert v. Munter, 136 Wash. 164, 176,239 P. 210, 214 (1925). 
172. See, e.g., Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 106, 160 N.E.2d 43, 48, 188 N.Y.S.2d 491, 
497 ("Notwithstanding section 474, ... few propositions are better established than that 
our courts do retain this power of supervision" of contingent fee agreements), modified, 6 
N.Y.2d 983, 161 N.E.2d 736, 191 N.Y.S.2d 951 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 374 (1960); 
Rooney v. Second Ave. R.R., 18 N.Y. 368, 369 (1858) ("There is no less reason for the 
exercise of [judicial] power [over attorneys and clients] now than before adoption of the 
Code."). 
173. This position could be defended by accepting a broad "intention of the parties" 
construction, see supra notes 77-102 and accompanying text; by an expansive reading of 
the exceptions noted in Martin v. Camp, see supra notes 41-58 and accompanying text; or 
from breathing life into section 474, which actually lived only for a nanosecond. See 
supra Part II. 
174. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356(1) (1981) (liquidated damages and 
penalties clause). 
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they may specify a sum or other consideration in their contract that the ., 
breaching party will pay and/or-the non-breaching party will retain upon 
breach. If the clause minimizes contract risk, cost or uncertainty, or dis-
courages inefficient breaches, policy applauds the provision. 175 But if the 
clause imposes costs en otherwise efficient breaches-if it has an in ter-
rorem 176 effect-it is rejected because it violates the compensation princi-
ple of contract remedies, 177 which prohibits punitive damages. The 
compensation principle seeks instead to put the aggrieved party in as 
good a position as if the breaching party had fully performed. 178 Alter-
natively, in the case of restitution, the attempt is to restore the status quo 
ante. 179 As will be discussed in the next section, liquidated damages 
clauses and a specialized form of them called take-or-pay contracts180 fall 
in the first category and are upheld by policy; penalties fall in the second 
category, and are rejected because of their in terrorem effect. 
A. Liquidated Damages 
To be enforceable as a liquidated damages provision, a clause that sets 
an amount to be paid in the event of breach must meet two conditions. 181 
First, the sum must be a reasonable estimate of damages from breach, 
and second, the amount of loss upon breach must be unascertainable or 
difficult to prove. 182 Clauses that fail the liquidated damages test are 
characterized as unenforceable penalties. 183 
To be valid under a liquidated damages analysis, a nonrefundable re-
175. See Wassenaar v. Panos, 111 Wis. 2d 518, 528, 331 N.W.2d 357, 362 (1983); 
Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: 
Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 Colum. L. 
Rev. 554, 558 (1977). 
176. If the cost of breach is set considerably higher than both the value of the breach to 
the breaching party and the loss to the nonbreaching party, then breach obviously will be 
substantially precluded. Indeed, contract performance would then be exacted by strong 
economic compulsion. The penalty would be more akin to punitive sanctions for a tor-
tious breach of duty than to the compensatory model of contract remedies. 
177. See A. Farnsworth, Contracts § 12.18, at 896 (1982); Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, ch. 16 introductory note, at 100 (1981). 
178. See U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1987); G. Gilmore, The Death of Contract 14-17 (1974); 
Goetz & Scott, supra note 175, at 558. 
179. See D. Dobbs, Remedies, 792-93 (1984). 
180. See infra notes 197-200 and accompanying text. 
181. This is a rather shorthand way of stating the doctrine, but it is sufficient for ana-
lyzing the nonrefundable retainer. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 175, at 554 n.3 ("The 
rationale for designating a particular liquidated damages provision a penalty has as many 
formulations as there are treatments of the doctrine."). 
182. See Truck Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Puritan Farms 2nd, Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 420, 425, 
361 N.E.2d 1015, 1018, 393 N.Y.S.2d 365, 369 (1977); Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts§ 356 (1981). 
183. See Northwest Collectors, Inc. v. Enders, 74 Wash. 2d 585, 594, 446 P.2d 200, 
206 (1968) ("A provision in a contract which bears no reasonable relation to actual dam-
ages will be construed as a penalty."); 5 A. Corbin on Contracts § 1058, at 337 (1963) 
("When the· provision is one that will be enforced by the court, the amount specified 
therein is called liquidated damages. In cases where enforcement is denied, it is said that 
the parties have provided for a penalty or a forfeiture."). 
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_ tainer has to be intended as an estimate of damages, with the lawyer and 
client negotiating the designated amount based on an assessment of the 
likely consequences to the lawyer should the client terminate the rela-
tionship. The estimate also must be reasonable, or intentionally compen-
satory. The lawyer also has to be able to demonstrate that his damages 
upon breach would be difficult if not impossible to determine. 184 
The typical nonrefundable retainer clause fails to satisfy the reasonable 
estimate condition for two reasons. First, the nonrefundable retainer en-
titles the lawyer to compensation without regard to mitigation obliga-
tions. 185 Such an effect constitutes a penalty rather than a liquidation of 
damages because it calls for an amount exceeding the lawyer's compensa-
tory expectations. 186 Second, the typical nonrefundable retainer, set at 
commencement of employment, is not designed to compensate the law-
yer for losses in the event of-a breach by the client, but rather to secure 
payment of the lawyer's fee. 187 Thus the typical nonrefundable retainer 
184. Compare Pacheco v. Scoblionko, 532 A.2d 1036, 1039 (Me. 1987) (burden of 
proving validity of liquidated damages provision is on its proponent even if the other 
party is in breach) with Vines v. Orchard Hills, Inc., 181 Conn. 501, 511, 435 A.2d 1022, 
1028 (1980) (burden is on party challenging liquidated damages provision even if that 
party is in breach) and Wassenaar v. Panos, 111 Wis. 2d 518, 526, 331 N.W.2d 357, 361 
(1983) (employer who terminates contract has burden of showing stipulated damages 
provision was unenforceable). 
185. See Truck Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Puritan Farms 2nd, Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 420, 421, 
361 N.E.2d 1015, 1016, 393 N.Y.S.2d 365, 367 (1977) (liquidated damages provision in 
truck lease valid because defined as balance due less 50 percent, representing parties' 
estimate of truck's re-rental value); Northwest Collectors, Inc. v. Enders, 74 Wash. 2d 
585,594,446 J>.2d 200, 206 (1968) (acceleration clause in equipment lease invalid because 
full contract amount was due without regard to actual damages sustained, i.e., without 
providing for mitigation); cf Wassenaar v. Panos, 111 Wis. 2d 518, 542-43, 331 N.W.2d 
357, 369 (1983) (valid liquidated damages clause moots mitigation obligations). 
186. Cf Wassenaar v. Panos, 111 Wis. 2d 518, 331 N.W.2d 357 (1983) (upholding 
clause as liquidated damages provision entitling hotel manager/employee to recover full 
contract amount upon his termination even though no mitigation was specified). The 
clause in Wassenaar was enforceable because the parties negotiated with concern for the 
employee's job security and could have anticipated, and were therefore permitted to agree 
on, the employee's consequential damages upon terminating: injury to reputation, loss of 
career development, emotional distress, and other "anticipated elements," such as "salary 
lost while out of work, expenses of finding a new job, [and] lower salary on the new job." 
Id. at 536-37, 331 N.W.2d at 365-66. A lawyer-employee is unable to rely on these cir-
cumstances to waive his mitigation obligations through a nonrefundable retainer because 
his consequential damages, if any, are different. Nonrefundable retainers are not 
prompted by concern for job security. A lawyer's reputation generally is unsullied be-
cause no one, other than the law firm, knows or is concerned about the client's termina-
tion. In addition, because the lawyer has many clients at once, she, unlike the hotel 
employee who has but one employer, has greater mitigation opportunities. 
187. See N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Op. 570, at 4 (1985) ("We are also mindful that the very 
reason that many lawyers require advance fee payments in the first place is so that they 
will not be subject to a client's refusal to pay for legal services after they are rendered."). 
When a deposit is given as security for payment of a contract debt, moreover, the non-
breaching party may keep that part representing damages but must return the rest. See 
Peirson v. Lloyds First Mortgage Co., 260 N .Y. 214, 222, 183 N.E. 368, 370 (1932); 
Bellefonte Borough Auth. v. Gateway Equip. & Supply Co., 442 Pa. 492, 497, 277 A.2d 
347, 349-50 (1971). Likewise, since nonrefundable retainers are often required as security 
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is an in terrorem device discouraging client termination rather than a 
good faith estimate of the net losses the lawyer will sustain upon client 
breach. 188 
The second condition-difficulty of proving losses-depends on the 
nature of the representation. Unless unusual litigation or negotiation is a 
component of the representation, lawyers are usually able to estimate the 
time required to perform legal tasks. The second condition of valid liqui-
dated damages clauses is therefore generally unmet. 
An analysis of Gross v. Russo 189 under contract principles illustrates 
the failure of nonrefundable retainers from this perspective. In Gross, the 
agreement called for "liquidated damages" of $25,000 if the client 
breached. 190 The appellate court, which upheld the provision and which 
apparently· wished to legitimate the nonrefundable retainer, described 
this characterization as "unfortunate language"; presumably it perceived 
that the clause not only failed the two-pronged liquidated damages test 
but also was patently a penalty. 191 The Gross retainer thus not only vio-
lated Martin's fiduciary principles by imposing a "penalty," it also failed 
from a contract perspective by imposing a "substantial penalty." The 
clause could not be sustained as "liquidated damages"; thus it appears 
that it was sustained by fiat. 192 
In assessing whether a nonrefundable retainer is a valid liquidated 
damages clause or an invalid penalty, the parties' sophistication might be 
relevant. 193 Thus, despite "deep hostility" to penalty clauses, a persistent 
question is "whether a modem court should refuse to enforce a penalty 
clause where the signator [sic] is a substantial corporation, well able to 
for payment of a fee, the lawyer may retain only that portion of the nonrefundable re-
taim:r representing actual damages in quantum meruit and must return the rest to the 
client. 
188. See supra note 176. 
189. 47 A.D.2d 655, 364 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1975). See supra notes 93-103 and accompany-
ing text. 
190. See Gross, 47 A.D.2d at 655, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 185-86. 
191. The lower court observed that $25,000 would have been payable for the lawyer's 
pre-agreement services plus the estimable prospective services at the time of the agree-
ment, and concluded that termination before the prospective services were rendered 
would impose a substantial penalty on the client. See Gross v. Russo, 76 Misc. 2d 441, 
444, 351 N.Y.S.2d 355, 359 (Sup. Ct. 1974), rev'd, 47 A.D.2d 655, 364 N.Y.S.2d 184 
(1975). Since that termination occurred, such a substantial penalty actually resulted. 
Although the determination that the $25,000 caused a substantial penalty spoke from the 
Martin perspective of imposing discharge costs on clients, see supra notes 28-30 and ac-
companying text, it strongly implies that it was also a penalty in the contract sense be-
cause a penalty violates Martin even if it is insubstantial. Of course, the two "penalties" 
do not have identical meanings. 
192. See supra notes 89-102 and accompanying text. 
193. Cf Truck Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Puritan Farms 2nd, Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 420, 426-
27, 361 N.E.2d 1015, 1019-20, 393 N.Y.S.2d 365, 370-71 (1977) (attaching no signifi-
cance to use of printed form because "[t]here is no indication of any disparity of bargain-
ing power or of unconscionability"). 
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avoid improvident commitments." 194 For example, a Wall Street law 
firm advising a Fortune 500 company with inside general counsel may 
rightly expect its nonrefundable retainer to be enforced as liquidated 
damages. 195 Many attorney-client agreements, however, involve an un-
sophisticated, uncounseled client, unable to evaluate the proposed fee 
agreement. That inability further counsels against enforcing nonrefund-
able retainers. 196 · 
A specialized form of liquidated damages is the take-or-pay clause, 
which literally obligates a buyer to accept goods or services or pay for 
them anyway. 197 The legal validity of such clauses is determined by ap-
plying liquidated damages criteria tailored to the factual contexts in 
which take-or-pay clauses are typically :sought to be applied. For in-
stance, take-or-pay clauses are applied where the supplier makes a sub-
stantial investment in order to supply the buyer; in exchange, the buyer 
agrees to a long term commitment to buy specified quantities that will 
amortize the supplier's investment.198 The device serves to apportion 
risk where transactional uncertainty is particularly high and is enforce-
able as long as that allocation is reasonable in relation to the risk and to 
the corresponding reliance of the parties. 199 Take-or-pay clauses thus are 
194. Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co.; 769 F.2d 1284, 1288-89 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(Posner, J.). · 
195. Cf. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison v. Telex Corp., 602 F.2d 866, 875 (9th Cir.) 
(minimum contingent fee of $1 million not tin.conscionable when multi-million dollar 
corporation of superior bargaining strength sought best possible counsel), cert. denied, 
444 U.S. 981 (1979). . 
196. Cf. Schenk v. Hill, Lent & Troescher, N.Y.L.J., July 11, 1988, at 30, col. 3 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct.) (client's consent alone is insufficient proof of full understanding of legal rights); 
Cooper & Keys v. Bell, 127 Tenn. 142, 150, 153 S.W. 844, 846-47 (1913) (contract unen-
forceable unless attorney can show client understood meaning and effect of written attor-
ney-client contract); Committee on Legal Ethics v. Tatterson, 352 S.E. 2d 107, 113 (W. 
Va. 1986) ( even with client consent, an attorney's fee is "clearly excessive" if grossly 
disproportionate to amount of work required). 
197. The only judicial discussion of the confluence of take-or-pay and liquidated dam-
ages analysis appears in Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1292 (7th 
Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.) ("If .. . a supplier's fixed costs were a very large fraction of his 
total costs, a take-or-pay clause might well be a reasonable liquidation of damages."). 
For discussion of take-or-pay contracts, see International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. 
Llano, Inc., 770 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986); National 
Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Public Util. Comm'n, 76 Pa. Commw. 102,464 
A.2d 546 (1983); Pierce, State Regulation of Natural Gas in a Federally Deregulated 
Market: The Tragedy of the Commons Revisited, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 15, 18-20 (1987). 
198. Contracts for the sale of natural gas are the paradigm case. They often contain 
take-or-pay clauses under which the buyer must accept a specified minimum amount of 
gas over a designated period at a formulated price or pay that price in any case. See 
International Minerals, 770 F.2d at 879; National Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 76 Pa. 
Commw. at 106-07, 464 A.2d at 549; Pierce, supra note 197, at 18-20. 
For an analysis of take-or-pay contracts from a national energy policy perspective, see 
Comment, Take-Or-Pay: The D.C Circuit Forces the FERC's Hand, 23 Land & Water L. 
Rev. 149 (1988); Comment, Take-Or-Pay Provisions: Major Problems/or the Natural Gas 
Industry, 18 St. Mary's L.J. 251 (1986). 
199. Cf. National Telecanvass Assoc. v. Smith, 98 A.D.2d 796, 470 N.Y.S.2d 22 
(1983) (liquidated damages clause in telecanvassing contract disproportionate to plain-
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valid as a species of liquidated damages if damages are difficult to prove 
or are unascertainable because of transactional uncertainty due to, for 
instance, market volatility or regulatory changes. 200 
An examination of the specialized risk factors in these contracts leads 
to the conclusion that, in liquidated damages terms, take-or-pay clauses 
are valid if the amount is reasonable in relation to the risk and reliance at 
the time of contract and if losses are difficult to ascertain given inordinate 
fluctuations in transactional variables. 201 
Nonrefundable retainers functionally may be seen as a type of take-or-
pay clause because the client agrees to take designated legal services at 
the nonrefundable retainer price or to pay that price in any case. The 
lawyer, however, faces no risk equivalent to the natural gas supplier or 
other risk-assuming provider. There is no danger of not recovering fixed 
start-up costs of representation because the lawyer has none, and market 
demand for legal services is not volatile. Accordingly, the arguments 
that sustain take-or-pay clauses as valid liquidated damages provisions in 
long term supply contexts do not apply in the lawyer-client context to 
sustain the nonrefundable retainers.202 Before concluding that contract 
tiff's probable loss, and therefore deemed unenforceable as a penalty). Although the term 
"take-or-pay" was not used, the parties in Smith attempted a kind of take-or-pay provi-
sion, specifying that a political campaign committee would pay for a minimum of 500,000 
telephone canvassing calls whether they were made or not. Given that the canvassing 
company's principal was an avowed expert in conducting massive political telecanvassing 
such as the one agreed to, the company apparently incurred no substantial start-up costs 
in connection with the aborted campaign. See id. at 798, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 24-25. Hence, 
the clause was an unenforceable penalty because there was no reasonable relation between 
it and the probable loss. See id. at 797-98, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 24. 
200. Cf. id. at 798, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 24-25 (clause also unenforceable because it did not 
appear that actual damages would be difficult to prove or estimate). 
201. In natural gas sales contracts, for instance, the supplier requires the take-or-pay 
clause to cover two risks. First, it is necessary to protect performance outlays where the 
supplier's fixed costs of performance are a large percentage of total costs. See Lake River 
Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1292 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.). Second, it 
is required to insulate the supplier from the risk of sharply declining market demand. See 
Universal Resources Corp. v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line, 813 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1987). 
Negotiations center on actual and expected market and regul_atory conditions and the 
supplier often uses the contract as security to develop and fin;ince expansion of produc-
tive capacity needed to perform. See Pierce, supra note 197, at 18-20. The take-or-pay 
provision is legitimate when it minimizes contract risk by apportioning it and the supplier 
requires and relies on his customer's promise to take the specified contract amount. See 
Universal Resources Corp., 813 F.2d at 80. Lake River concerned a sell-or-pay clause, a 
functional equivalent of the take-or-pay clause. The clause was held invalid because the 
initial investment needed for performance was Jess than 20 percent of the amount agreed 
to as damages in case of breach, the investment was fully usable to service other custom-
ers, and the net recovery in case of breach exceeded by a factor of four the profit that 
would have been made had there been full performance. See Lake River Corp. v. Carbo-
rundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289-92 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.). 
202. Even if the trust-based theory yields to contract analysis and if the liquidated 
damages test is met, other fiduciary principles remain. For example, the typical client is 
ill-equipped to evaluate a lawyer's proffer that X dollars is a reasonable estimate of losses 
due to client breach. Instead, he must rely on the lawyer's representation, which may be 
reasonable from a contract but not from a fiduciary perspective. Since the fiduciary is 
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law almost always invalidates nonrefundable retainers, however, the con-
ceptually distinct problem of judicial forfeiture must be addressed. 
B. Judicial Forfeiture 
Judicial forfeiture occurs by judicial invocation of the common law 
rule prohibiting a breaching party from recovering in restitution upon his 
breach.203 It is to be distinguished from the contractual forfeiture provi-
sion-a type of liquidated damages clause in which a down payment is 
designated as the liquidated sum. Such a clause literally provides that 
upon breach a non-breaching party may retain consideration previously 
provided by a breaching party.204 A nonrefundable retainer is a form of 
contractual forfeiture because it provides that, if the client breaches, he 
forfeits the advance fee, which the lawyer is to retain as liquidated dam-
ages. Its status as liquidated damages or penalty would be superfluous, 
however, if judicial forfeitures were permitted-the breaching client 
would not be able to raise the issue or to regain that part of his advance 
payment exceeding the lawyer's damages. Accordingly, it is both appro-
priate and necessary to consider the current status of the judicial forfei-
ture rule. 
The ancient common law is said uniformly to have denied the breach-
ing party's right to restitution. 205 The centuries-old debate over the pro-
priety of this rule206 has obscured the fact that it probably never 
under a duty to disclose all material facts, see SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 
U.S. 180, 194 (1963); Klein v. First Edina Nat'! Bank, 293 Minn. 418,421, 196 N.W.2d 
619,622 (1972), and must deal fairly with his client, see Gordon v. Bialystoker Center, 45 
N.Y.2d 692, 698, 385 N.E.2d 285, 288, 412 N.Y.S.2d 593, 597 (1978), meeting the con-
tract standard may still fall short of meeting the fiduciary standard. 
203. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts§ 15-1, at 647 (3d ed. 1987); 
A. Farnsworth, supra note 177, § 8.14, at 600. Note that such a forfeiture penalizes 
additional performance because the amount forfeited increases with partial performance. 
See Corbin, The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of Installments Paid, 40 
Yale L.J. 1013 (1931). 
204. The judicially imposed forfeiture rule is the conceptual diametric of the liquidated 
damages/penalty rule. The former, emphasizing "freedom of contract," allows for dam-
ages that are not compensatory; the latter, emphasizing "social control," permits the pro-
vision of determined damages clauses only if they are compensatory. The organizing 
principle of the first and second editions of the Contracts casebook by Professors Fried-
rich Kessler, Malcom Sharp, and Grant Gilmore was the tension between "free volition" 
or " freedom of contract" and "social control." See F. Kessler & G. Gilmore, Contracts: 
Cases and Materials Teacher's Manual (1971) (hereinafter Kessler I) (unpublished) 
(available in the files of the Fordham Law Review). Compare F. Kessler, G . Gilmore & 
A. Kronman, Contracts Cases and Materials 1-17 (3d ed. 1986) (hereinafter Kessler III) 
(contractual liability understood through the competing theories of freedom versus fair-
ness and autonomy versus social responsibility) with F. Kessler & G. Gilmore, Contracts 
Cases and Materials 1-38 (2d ed. 1970) (hereinafter Kessler II) (transactions are influ-
enced by the tensions between free bargaining and social control). This Article does not 
treat this conceptual tension, which has yet to be considered in depth in the literature. 
205. See Kessler III, supra note 204, at 1058-59. 
206. See, e.g., Perillo, Restitution in the Second Restatement of Contracts, 81 Col um. L. 
Rev. 37, 50 (1981). 
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commanded the unanimous consent habitually claimed for it. 207 In fact, 
no more than twenty states ever reported opinions embracing the judicial 
forfeiture rule. 208 On the other hand, the rule has been rejected in re-
ported opinions by twenty-two states,209 including many initial support-
ers, and three federal circuit courts.210 Confusion has stirred over which 
is the majority and which is the minority position. 211 A plausible expla-
nation for the confusion212 is that the "common law rule" was taken to 
207. See 5A A. Corbin, supra note 183, § 1122, at 3 (common law rule is a broad 
statement unsupported by actual case law). 
208. See Tomboy Gold & Copper v. Marks, 185 Cal. 336, 197 P. 94 (1921); Thach v. 
Durham, 120 Colo. 253, 208 P.2d 1159 (1949); Foss-Hughes Co. v. Norman, 32 Del. 108, 
119 A. 854 (Super. Ct. 1923); Beatty v. Flannery, 49 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1950); Wheeler v. 
Mather, 56 Ill. 241 (1870); Stevens v. Brown, 60 Iowa 403, 14 N.W. 735 (1883); Gibbons 
v. Hayden, 3 Kan. App. 38, 44 P. 445 (1896); Stark v. Parker, 19 Mass. (1 Pick.) 267 
(1824); Miller v. Snedeker, 257 Minn. 204, 101 N.W.2d 213 (1960); Ellinghouse v. Han-
sen Packing Co., 66 Mont. 444, 213 P. 1087 (1923); Lexington Mill & Elevator Co. v. 
Neuens, 42 Neb. 649, 60 N.W. 893 (1894); Katz v. Katz, 134 N.J.L. 303, 47 A.2d 423 
(1946); Dunken v. Guess, 40 N.M. 156, 56 P.2d 1123 (1936); Smith v. Brady, 17 N.Y. 
173 (1858); Brannock v. Fletcher, 271 N.C. 65, 155 S.E.2d 532 (1967); Pfeiffer v. Nor-
man, 22 N.D. 168, 133 N.W. 97 (1911); Livesley v. Strauss, 104 Or. 356, 206 P. 850 
(1922); Atlantic City Tire & Rubber Corp. v. Southwark Foundry & Mach. Co., 289 Pa. 
569, 137 A. 807 (1927); Engstrom v. Bushnell, 20 Utah 2d 250, 436 P.2d 806 (1968); Neis 
v. O'Brien, 12 Wash. 358, 41 P. 59 (1895). 
209. See Nordin Constr. Co. v. City of Nome, 489 P.2d 455 (Alaska 1971); Freedman 
v. Rector, 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951); Leoffler v, Wilcox, 132 Colo. 449, 289 P.2d 
902 (1955); Vines v. Orchard Hills, Inc., 181 Conn. 501, 435 A.2d 1022 (1980); Haas v. 
Crisp Realty Co., 65 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1953); Boyce Constr. Co. v. Valencia Community 
College, 414 So. 2d 634 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Nelson v. Hazel, 91 Idaho 850, 433 
P.2d 120 (1967); Nichols v. Knowles, 87 Idaho 550, 394 P.2d 630 (1964); McLendon v. 
Safe Realty Corp., 401 N.E.2d 80 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Washington v. Claassen, 218 
Kan. 577, 545 P.2d 387 (1976); Woodliffv. Al Parker Sec. Co., 233 Mich. 154,206 N.W. 
499 (1925); Maxey v. Grindmeyer, 379 So. 2d 297 (Miss. 1980); Kitchen v. Mori, 84 Nev. 
181, 437 P.2d 865 (1968); Humphrey v. Sagouspe, 50 Nev. 157, 254 P. 1074 (1927); R.J. 
Berke & Co. v. J. P. Griffin, Inc., 116 N.H. 760, 367 A.2d 583, (1976); Comerata v. 
Chaumont, Inc., 52 N .J. Super. 299, 145 A.2d 471 (1958); Kulseth v. Rotenberger, 320 
N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1982); Kirkland v. Archbold, 113 N.E.2d 496 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953); 
Massey v. Love, 478 P.2d 948 (Okla. 1971); Golden v. Golden, 273 Or. 506, 541 P.2d 
1397 (1975); Lancellotti v. Thomas, 341 Pa. Super. l, 491 A.2d 117 (1985); DeLeon v. 
Aldrete, 398 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Perkins 
v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952); Mallory v. City of Olympia, 83 Wash. 
499, 145 P. 627 (1915); Schwartz v. Syver, 264 Wis. 526, 59 N.W.2d 489 (1953), over-
ruled, 19 Wis. 2d 597, 120 N.W.2d 679 (1963); Schneider v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 
196 Wis. 56, 219 N .W. 370 (1928). 
210. See American Sur. Co. v. United States, 368 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1966); Hook v. 
Bomar, 320 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1963); Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Miehle Printing Press & 
Mfg. Co., 206 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1953). 
211. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 203, § 11.22, at 477 (restitution for the 
breaching party has met "fairly wide acceptance" but "the majority of jurisdictions ap-
pear to adhere to the general principle that a defaulting party has no remedy notwith-
standing the degree of hardship and forfeiture he may suffer."); 1 G. Palmer, Law of 
Restitution§ 5.13, at 651-52 (1978) (rule of Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481 (1834), al-
lowing restitution, still "a minority position" but nothing is certain); 12 S. Williston, 
Contracts § 1473, at 222-24 n.3 (3d ed. 1957) (cases allowing recovery constitute the 
weight of authority). 
212. An alternative explanation for the confusion is that instead of one rule covering 
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mean "embraced by fifty states" so that converting it from the majority 
rule to the minority rule meant waiting until twenty-six states had re-
jected it. But since many states have never decided the problem, the de-
nominator is less than fifty and the necessary numerator for conversion is 
less than twenty-six.213 To avoid perpetuating or claiming to resolve the 
confusion, this Article adopts the following taxonomy: judicial forfeiture 
is the old rule, restitution is the modem rule.214 
Under the modern rule, an employee who breaches a one-year term 
contract after ten months is entitled to recover in quantum meruit,215 but 
not on the contract itself.216 The old rule would have denied recovery to 
the breaching employee; he would have forfeited the value of his ten 
months of labor.217 Among the leading cases espousing this forfeiture 
principle was Smith v. Brady,218 where a plurality of New York's Court 
of Appeals denied recovery to a builder. who did not meet exacting con-
tract specifications because the owner did not get what he bargained 
for. 219 The result under the old rule in Smith was not particularly harsh 
because progress payments had been made throughout the contract term 
and the builder had been denied only the final payment.220 Nevertheless, 
Judge Comstock unwittingly supplied generations of contracts scholars 
with fertile debating ground by condemning and penalizing breaching 
parties. 
In later cases, courts scrutinized and rejected the rule when its harsh-
ness became evident.221 New York has been at the forefront of a losing 
all contracts there are four, one each for sales of goods, construction contracts, employ-
ment agreements, and installment land sales. See D. Dobbs, supra note 179, §§ 12.7-
12.26, at 832-935. Because this Article avoids using the slippery categories of majority 
and minority, it is able to abstract above these four subsidiary rules to generalize about 
the parent rule. 
213. Further, forty-nine states have adopted some version of Article 2 of the U.C.C., 
see White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code§ 1, at 1 (3d ed. 1988), so that in the 
sale of goods context, all states except Louisiana allow the breaching party to recover in 
restitution. See U.C.C. § 2-718(2) (1987). 
214. See Maxton Builders, Inc. v. Lo Galbo, 68 N.Y.2d 373, 502 N.E.2d 184, 509 
N.Y.S.2d 507 (1986) (using this taxonomy). See infra text accompanying notes 225-40. 
This trend reflects the broader transformation in contract doctrine away from rigid 19th 
century rules toward a flexible analysis epitomized by the shift from impossibility to im-
practibility. See A. Farnsworth, supra note 177, § 8.14, at 600 ("In recent years, courts 
have tended to grant restitution to the party in breach."). 
215. Of course, such problems are not common today because employment contracts 
are typically payable at least monthly. 
216. The employee therefore would not be automatically entitled to recover 10/12 of 
the contract, although that would be the limit. See Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481 (1834) 
(New Hampshire was ahead of its time). 
217. See Stark v. Parker, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 267, 274-75 (1824). 
218. 17 N.Y. 173 (1858) (Comstock, J.) (plural~ty opinion). 
219. See id. at 186-87. 
220. See id. at 174. 
221. See Vines v. Orchard Hills, Inc., 181 Conn. 501, 505, 435 A.2d 1022, 1026 (1980) 
(Peters, J.) (citing five early cases barring recovery and thirteen more recent cases al-
lowing claims in restitution). 
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battle to preserve the old judicial forfeiture rule.222 But even in New 
York, as elsewhere, courts have recognized the rule's potential unfairness 
and have attempted to minimize its harsh results by employing such es-
cape outlets as waiver, divisibility, and "equity."223 For many years New 
York courts "obediently went through the two-way stretch" under which 
they would cite the forfeiture rule and then the waiver exception, an ob-
lique approach that "has enjoyed at most a literary existence."224 
New York's most recent pronouncements evince a Cardozo-esque 
transformation to the modem rule---an exposition characterized by re-
sounding affirmation masking dramatic change. 225 In Maxton Builders, 
Inc. v. Lo Galbo,226 a seller of real estate retained a 10 percent deposit, 
which the breaching buyer sought to recover. 227 The New York Court of 
Appeals was asked to "reexamine the rule of Lawrence v. Miller, . . . 
which permits a vendor on a real estate contract to retain the down pay-
ment when the purchaser willfully defaults."228 
The court acknowledged criticism that the old rule---which it charac-
terized as the "parent rule," denying recovery in many factual contexts, 
including construction, employment, installment land sales contracts and 
sales of goods229-is "out of harmony with the general principle that ac-
tual damages is the proper measure of recovery for a breach of con-
222. See Maxton Builders, Inc. v. Lo Galbo, 68 N.Y.2d 373, 502 N.E.2d 184, 509 
N.Y.S.2d 507 (1986); 32 Beechwood Corp. v. Fisher, 19 N.Y.2d 1008, 228 N.E.2d 823, 
281 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1967); Lawrence v. Miller, 86 N .Y. 131 (1881); infra text accompany-
ing notes 225-40. 
223. See Glovsky v. Holly Point Estates, Inc., 354 Mass. 94, 236 N.E.2d 202 (1968) 
(equity required restoring real property down payment to plaintiff); Housing Authority v. 
Warrick, 100 N.J. Super. 256, 241 A.2d 655 (1968) (forfeiture of land installment pay-
ments without warning was unconscionable; contract not literally enforced); Jacob & 
Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921) (substantial performance doc-
trine invoked to produce equitable result); Avery v. Willson, 81 N.Y. 341 (1880) (facts 
justified waiver of complete performance before liability arose); Ruiz v. Crespi, 46 A.D.2d 
44, 360 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1974) (equity supported plaintiff 's recovery of real estate down 
payment); Gerder Services, Inc. v. Johnson, 109 Misc. 2d 216, 439 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Sup. 
Ct. 1981) (land sales contract providing for absolute forfeiture was inequitable and unen-
forceable); Brannock v. Fletcher, 271 N.C. 65, 155 S.E.2d 532 (1967) (in equity, vendee 
may recover down payment less reasonable rental value in event of vendor's breach); 
Malmberg v. Baugh, 62 Utah 331, 218 P. 975 (1923) (in forfeiture, equitable principles 
prevent enforcement of rule granting damages in excess of just compensation). 
224. Kessler III, supra note 204, at 1038-39. 
225. Judge Clark's prophecy may at last have been realized. See Amtorg Trading 
Corp. v. Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co., 206 F.2d 103, 105-07 (2d Cir. 1953) (chroni-
cling the trend in the law of contracts advocating that a contracting party in default 
should be able to recover "the amount of actual benefit conferred on the opposing party," 
and speculating that the New York Court of Appeals "might well give some effect" to 
this trend); cf J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 203, § 11-22, at 477 n.69 (noting that 
anticipated change in New York Jaw has not occurred). 
226. 68 N.Y.2d 373, 502 N.E.2d 184, 509 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1986). 
227. The sales contract did not contain a forfeiture provision, which would have be-
come relevant given the court's circumvention of the old rule. 
228. Maxton Builders, 68 N.Y.2d at 376, 502 N.E.2d at 185, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 508. 
229. See id. at 379, 502 N.E.2d at 187, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 510. 
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tract. "230 The court further observed that the "modern rule" allows "a 
party in default to recover for part performance to the extent of the net 
benefit conferred. ,m 1 The court sympathized with this position, ap-
plauding the modern rule as having "much to commend it,"232 and indi-
cated that even New York had widely rejected the parent rule: "In most 
areas of the law the Legislature and the courts, have now adopted rules 
generally permitting a party in default to recover for part performance to 
the extent of the net benefit conferred. "233 In addition, the court could 
have added that even before these express declarations, much of Smith v. 
Brady,2 34 New York's version of the parent rule, had been eviscerated 
under the oblique "two-way stretch" method. 235 The court then stated 
that, notwithstanding the eclipse of the parent rule in "most" cases, a 
subsidiary forfeiture rule endured in most jurisdictions for real estate 
sales contracts, "especially where the down payment does not exceed 10 
percent of the contract price."236 lt thus appears that the judicial forfei-
ture rule is dead in New York in all but real estate down payment cases. 
Even there, however, rather than embracing the old rule as written in 
Lawrence v. Miller 231 and categorically foreclosing a breaching party's 
recovery, the court prescribed a modified analysis: 
That analysis begins by considering whether the agreement expressly 
provides that the seller could retain [the down payment] upon default. 
If it did, the provision would probably be upheld as a valid liquidated 
damages clause in view of the recognized difficulty of estimating actual 
damages and the general acceptance of the traditional 10% down pay-
ment as a reasonable amount. 238 
However, "[i]f the contract itself is deemed to pose no bar,"239 for in-
stance, if it does not contain a liquidated damages clause entitling the 
seller to retain the down payment, then the buyer could recover at least 
some of his down payment. He can do so, however, only if he meets the 
230. Id. at 378, 502 N.E.2d at 186, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 509. 
231. Id. at 380, 502 N.E.2d at 187-88, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 511. 
232. Id. at 381, 502 N.E.2d at 188, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 510-11. 
233. Id. at 380, 502 N.E.2d at 188, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 511 (citing Amtorg Trading Corp. 
v. Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co., 206 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1953)); see Jacob & Youngs, 
Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921); U.C.C. § 2-718 (1987). 
234. 17 N.Y. 173 (1858). 
235. See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
236. Maxton Builders, Inc. v. Lo Galbo, 68 N.Y.2d 373,380,502 N.E.2d 184, 188, 509 
N.Y.S.2d 507, 511 (1986). But see Lancellotti v. Thomas, 341 Pa. Super. 1, 9, 491 A.2d 
117, 121 (1985) ("the common law rule is no longer intact even with respect to land sales 
contracts"). 
237. 86 N .Y . 131 (1881). 
238. Maxton , 68 N.Y.2d at 382, 502 N.E.2d at 189, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 512. The court 
also observed that the Restatement (Second) of Contracts adopts the "modem rule," but 
recognizes an exception for liquidated damages. See id. at 380, 502 N.E.2d at 187, 509 
N.Y.S.2d at 510; cf Freedman v. Rector, 37 Cal. 2d 16,230 P.2d 629 (1951) (11 percent 
real estate down payment liquidated damages clause presumptively valid if reasonable in 
amount, but invalid if damages easily ascertainable). 
239. Maxton, 68 N.Y.2d at 382, 502 N.E.2d at 189, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 512. 
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burden of showing that the down payment exceeded actual damages, 
which is a heavy burden when the down payment is 10 percent or less.240 
Under this subtle transformation of New York's evaporating judicial 
forfeiture rule, then, the buyer will rarely, if ever, be able to recover his 
down payment where it is 10 percent or less of the purchase price; Law-
rence therefore still reigns. When the down payment exceeds 10 percent, 
however, and there is no liquidated damages clause, the buyer can seek 
return of that part exceeding actual damages241 and Lawrence is de-
throned. When it exceeds 10 percent and the agreement contains a liqui-
dated damages clause, the buyer will be able to seek the same return 
under an alternate liquidated damages analysis. The difference in the 
buyer's arguments caused by the presence or absence of the liquidated 
damages clause is principally temporal. With the clause, reasonableness 
of damages is analyzed from the perspective of prospective damages as of 
the contract's making. Without the clause, reasonableness-that is, 
whether the sum to be forfeited exceeds actual damages-is determined 
as of the time of breach.242 This modified analysis, which the court 
called "a change in the law," "will provide a forum" for the parties to 
"dispute their differences,"243 rather than foreclosing that opportunity 
under the now interred judicial forfeiture rule. 244 
To summarize, if the judicial forfeiture rule still reigned, it would deny 
the breaching client the right to sue in restitution for the return of that 
part of his advance fee payment that exceeded actual damages. The 
question of the validity of nonrefundable retainers could not then be 
reached. Moreover, since the modern rule firmly rejects the judicial for-
feiture principle, nonrefundable retainers cannot be sustained under the 
240. See id. at 382, 502 N.E.2d at 189, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 512. 
241. Since the down payment is given as security, the buyer will be able to recover any 
amount that would impose a penalty (i.e., any amount exceeding the seller's damages). 
See 5 A. Corbin, supra note 183, § 1074, at 415-16 ("A penalty will not be enforced 
merely because it is in the form of a deposit."). 
242. In either case, there appears to be no issue that the damages would be difficult to 
prove or unascertainable. 
243. Maxton, 68 N.Y.2d at 382, 502 N.E.2d at 189, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 512. 
244. The Maxton court may have intended a broader residual category of cases to 
endure suffering judicial forfeiture-it said "most" cases require allowing restitution but 
added that forfeiture still applies for 10 percent real estate down payments. See supra 
text accompanying note 228. The most likely candidate for inclusion in such a residual 
camp would be the service contract, which has not yet been expressly excluded from New 
York's old rule. Even indulging the conceivable assumption, however, that the Court of 
Appeals intended a broader category, without offering examples of what it might include, 
nonrefundable retainers would not belong there. The Maxton court indicated that 
"[e]xcept in cases where there is a real risk of overreaching, there should be no need for 
the courts to relieve the parties of the consequences [e.g., a forfeiture] of their contract." 
Maxton, 68 N.Y.2d at 382, 502 N.E.2d at 189, 509 N.Y.S.2d at 512. It is hard to think of 
a relationship in which the potential for overreaching is greater than where a client with 
an actual or potential legal problem seeks counsel from a loyal advisor. See Bradner v. 
Vasquez, 43 Cal. 2d 147,151,272 P.2d 11, 13 (1954); Robinson v. Sharp, 201 Ill. 86, 90, 
66 N.E. 299, 301 (1903); Wunschel Law Firm v. Clabaugh, 291 N.W.2d 331, 336 (Iowa 
1980). 
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now dishonored common law judicial forfeiture rule that prohibited the 
breaching party from recovering in restitution. Even New York, one of 
the last holdouts, has drastically curtailed the rule's applicability to a 
narrow class of real estate down payment contracts. 245 As a matter of 
contract law, therefore, the nonrefundable retainer frequently is invalid: 
it usually constitutes a penalty rather than a liquidated damages provi-
sion; it does not meet the specialized requirements of take-or-pay con-
tracts; and it is not protected by the judicial forfeiture rule. 
Nonetheless, one can conceive of circumstances, however unusual, in 
which a nonrefundable retainer may be valid. For example, if a lawyer is 
offered a substantial special retainer, payable in advance and nonrefund-
able, inducing him to leave his firm to represent a client in a protracted 
matter and the client breaches, the lawyer could retain that sum under all 
theories considered: first, under the trust-based theory, the nonrefund-
able retainer is valid because of the lawyer's change of position;246 sec-
ond, under a contract analysis, the nonrefundable retainer is a valid 
liquidated damages clause since it satisfies both the compensatory and 
unascertainability requirements;247 and third, again under contract anal-
ysis, it is a valid take-or-pay clause because of the heavy up-front expense 
of abandoning regular law firm income in reliance upon the client's long-
term commitment. 248 
C. Mitigation of Damages 
In the rare case when a nonrefundable retainer is a valid liquidated 
damages clause, the avoidable consequences doctrine is implicated upon 
breach. This doctrine requires an attorney to make reasonable efforts to 
mitigate damages. 249 Like other employees, an attorney is not entitled to 
"liv[e] in voluntary idleness" upon discharge but must seek alternative 
employment. 250 Damages are reduced by the amount the lawyer earned 
or could have earned doing comparable work. 251 The extent to which 
mitigation reduces damages depends on the injured lawyer's elasticity of 
capacity-the extent. to which the lawyer's practice can accommodate 
additional services for new or additional clients. 
If elasticity is infinite, then a lawyer is equivalent to the lost volume 
· seller of commercial law, whose damages are the lost profits from the 
broken contract not offset by the profits on the resale of the item in ques-
tion. This is because he would have benefited from two sales instead of 
245. See Maxton Builders, Inc. v. Lo Galbo, 68 N.Y.2d 373, 380, 502 N.E.2d 184, 188, 
509 N.Y.S.2d 507, 511 (1986). 
246. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. 
247. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text. 
248. See supra notes 197-200. 
249. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350 (1981). 
250. See Howard v. Daly, 61 N .Y . 362, 374 (1875). 
251. See, e.g., Gross v. Lamb, 1 Ohio App. 3d 1, 3-4, 437 N.E.2d 309, 312 (1980) (such 
work must be of a similar kind in a similar place). 
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one but for the breach. 252 Whether an attorney has a capacity that is 
both liberated and idled by the breach, therefore requiring him to miti-
gate, is a question of fact. But since most attorneys keep their plates 
full, 253 they often will be unable to satisfy the conditions of the lost vol-
ume seller; they will rarely have high elasticities of capacity. 254 
The most likely candidate for the lost volume lawyer category would 
be the large law firm that routinely recruits new associates; that minority 
of firms can plausibly argue that they can render services without limita-
tion and thus avoid the obligation to mitigate damages. In all cases, the 
client's liability upon breach would be determined by reducing the law-
yer's contract damages, usually based on expectancy, by his avoidable 
damages, based on comparable alternatives. In the lost volume case, this 
mitigation obligation will be zero. Unless a lawyer is able to show lost 
volume and difficulty in ascertaining damages, however, then the extent 
of his duty to mitigate is considered in determining the reasonableness of 
the sum fixed as a liquidated damages clause. The lawyer thus cannot 
use liquidated damages provisions to insulate himself from the obligation 
to mitigate. 
However, the same considerations that yield zero mitigation also limit 
if not preclude nonrefundable retainers from being good faith estimates 
of damages. Thus, in the case of the law firm equivalent to the lost vol-
ume seller, damages for breach would be limited to the profits lost as a 
consequence of the breach. Lost profits would be measured as lost reve-
nue less the cost that would have been incurred for hiring associates to 
undertake the work. Accordingly, even if mitigation is zero, damages are 
less than the amount of the price for the service. Therefore, for a 
nonrefundable retainer to be a reasonable estimate of damages, it would 
have to be conceived as a lost profit rather than a lost revenue. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article invoked venerable doctrines to analyze nonrefundable re-
tainers charged by lawyers. Such provisions have proven to be contrac-
tual forfeiture clauses that, as part of an attorney-client agreement, must 
be subject to special scrutiny. 
Because lawyers are fiduciaries of their clients, the law has granted 
clients the right to discharge their attorneys at any time for any reason. 
A corollary of this rule requires that no penalty be imposed on clients 
who exercise this right to discharge. Since nonrefundable retainers im-
252. See Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 393, 400, 285 N.E.2d 311, 314, 334 
N.Y.S.2d 165, 170 (1972); U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (1987); White & Summers, supra note 213, 
§ 7-9, at 314-15. 
253. See supra text accompanying note 52. 
254. Cf Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 347 comment f (1981) (because entrepre-
neurs tend to "operate at optimum capacity . .. it is possible that an additional transac-
tion would not have been profitable and that the injured party would not have chosen to 
expand his business by undertaking it had there been no breach"). 
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pose such penalties, they are to be condemned as inconsistent with the 
trust-based quality of the unfettered discharge right. 
The argument that the lawyer has a statutory right to bargain freely is 
based on erroneous statutory revision, and is, in any case, inconsistent 
with fiduciary law from which we draw the trust-based theory of the 
attorney-client relationship. Nevertheless, even assuming that attorneys 
should be entitled to bargain freely with their clients without the con-
straints of fiduciary law, nonrefundable retainers are generally unenforce-
able. Instead of constituting liquidated damages clauses, they typically 
function as unenforceable penalties. Accordingly, this increasingly prev-
alent and potentially oppressive clause must be eliminated from the stan-
dard form retainer agreements that currently are in widespread use. 255 
It would be the pinnacle of irony, moreover, to allow nonrefundable 
retainers in the teeth of fiduciary law when virtually all jurisdictions have 
determined that, in the arms-length commercial law sale-of-goods con-
text, forfeitures shall be limited to 20 percent of the value of total per-
formance to a limit of $500.256 Validating the nonrefundable retainer, 
despite contract and fiduciary law, would create another special rule for 
lawyers. 257 Such a rule would of course be lucrative, but would it be 
professionally responsible?258 
255. See supra note 2. 
256. See U.C.C. § 2-718(2) (1987); see also Maxton Builders, Inc. v. Lo Galbo, 68 
N.Y.2d 373, 381, 502 N.E.2d 184, 188, 509 N.Y.S.2d 507, 511 (1986). 
257. See supra note 9. 
258. "The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in 
the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the 
bar." Model Rules, supra note 22, Preamble. 
